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Although the Internet is valued by many of its supporters 
particularly because it both defies and defeats physical borders, 
these important attributes are now being exposed to attempts by 
both governments and private entities to impose territorial limits 
through blocking or permitting access to content by Internet users 
based on their geographical location—a territorial partitioning of 
the Internet.  One of these attempts is the recent Stop Online 
Piracy Act (―SOPA‖) proposal in the United States.  This article, 
as opposed to earlier literature on the topic discussing the possible 
virtues and methods of erecting borders in cyberspace, focuses on 
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an Internet activity that is designed to bypass the territorial 
partitioning of cyberspace and render any partitioning attempts 
ineffective.  The activity—cybertravel, or the evasion of 
geolocation—permits users to access content on the Internet that is 
normally not available when they connect to the Internet from their 
geographical location.  By utilizing an Internet protocol address 
that does not correspond to their physical location, but to a 
location from which access to the content is permitted, users can 
view or use content that is otherwise unavailable to them.  
Although cybertravel is not novel (some cybertravel tools have 
been available for a number of years), recently the tools allowing 
it have proliferated and become sufficiently user-friendly to allow 
even average Internet users to utilize them.  Indeed, there is an 
increasing interest in cybertravel among the general Internet 
public as more and more website operators employ geolocation 
tools to limit access to content on their websites from certain 
countries or regions. 
This article analyzes the current legal status of cybertravel and 
explores how the law may treat cybertravel in the future.  The 
analysis of the current legal framework covers copyright as well as 
other legal doctrines and the laws of multiple countries, with a 
special emphasis on U.S. law.  The future of the legal status of 
cybertravel will be strongly affected by the desire of countries and 
many Internet actors to erect borders on the Internet to facilitate 
compliance with territorially-defined regulation and enjoy the 
advantages of a territorially-partitioned cyberspace.  This article 
makes an attempt to identify arguments for making or keeping 
certain types of cybertravel legal, and suggests legal, 
technological, and business solutions for any cybertravel that may 
be permitted. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An important decision awaits countries and the international 
community at large: whether people should be free to break the 
territorial limits that governments and other entities attempt to 
impose on the Internet—whether Internet users should have the 
freedom to travel in cyberspace.  Traveling in cyberspace, or 
―cybertravel,‖ allows Internet users to view the Internet as if they 
were in a location other than where they are physically present.  
Users cybertravel by altering the information that identifies the 
geographical location from which they are accessing the Internet 
on the device they use to connect to the Internet.  Once they alter 
the information, they appear to the Internet world to be physically 
located in a different location.  Through cybertravel, Internet users 
are able to view or use content on the Internet that they would 
otherwise not be permitted to access because of geolocation tools 
that block access to content based on the geographical location of a 
user. 
While cybertravel is a network capability that many users 
appreciate, it frustrates the efforts of those who want geographical 
borders to be created and maintained on the Internet so that 
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Internet actors
1
 can comply with territorially-defined regulations or 
contractual obligations and enjoy certain advantages that result 
from a territorially-partitioned cyberspace—for example, the 
possibility of price differentiation in different markets or localized 
advertising.  Whether cybertravel should or should not be legal is 
not a matter of abstract academic debate; it is an important 
question that has already appeared on legislative agendas.
2
  This 
article presents cybertravel and its forms, explains the various uses 
of cybertravel, and assesses its legality.  It discusses whether there 
is a place for legal cybertravel on the Internet, and if there is a 
place, what legal, technological, and business solutions may 
facilitate that cybertravel.  Current developments make the 
discussion of the legality of cybertravel particularly timely; 
because cybertravel could subvert these developments, it is 
important at this point to clarify what its status should be. 
There is evidence of an increasing interest in the territorial 
partitioning of the Internet.  Despite the various projections for the 
future of the Internet that predicted a specific type of regulation 
that would apply to and on a ―borderless medium,‖3 governments 
want to have the territorial scope of regulation and enforcement on 
the Internet mirror the territorial limits of the physical world.
4
  This 
governmental interest in borders on the Internet is shared by 
private parties; while governments seek ways to protect their 
 
 1 The term ―Internet actors‖ is used not only to describe Internet users but also to 
describe anyone who acts on the Internet: website operators, Internet service providers, 
etc.  For an explanation of the terms ―website operator‖ and ―Internet service provider‖ as 
used in this article see infra notes 6 and 61 and the accompanying text. 
 2 See Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong., § 102(c)(4)(A)(ii) (2011). 
 3 See infra Part I.  A difference may be drawn between the regulation of the medium 
(regulation of the Internet—e.g., who should be in charge of assigning addresses on the 
Internet) and the regulation of activities that occur on the medium (regulation on the 
Internet—e.g., consumer protection laws, tax laws, defamation laws that apply to conduct 
on the Internet).  This article concerns any national regulation that is limited to a certain 
territory; such national regulation includes both types of regulation—regulation of the 
Internet (e.g., rules for Internet service providers) and regulation on the Internet (all 
national laws that may pertain to conduct on the Internet). 
 4 See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 785 (2001). 
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citizens from the influx of certain content,
5
 website operators
6
 
search for workable solutions to partition cyberspace in order to 
both secure compliance with territorially-limited regulation and 
enforcement and take advantage of the partitioned cybermarket.  
To achieve the partitioning, entities on the Internet employ 
geolocation tools to localize Internet users and control the content 
that is available to the users based on their location.  Increasingly, 
geolocation is not only a matter of voluntary adoption by Internet 
actors but also a matter of decree: governments and courts are 
beginning to mandate the use of geolocation tools as a valid means 
of achieving compliance with the laws of particular jurisdictions.
7
  
It is likely that as geolocation use increases to limit access to 
certain content
8
 it will generate more interest in cybertravel,
9
 
which will become widespread, undermine geolocation efforts, and 
 
 5 See, e.g., infra note 56 (seizures of domain names in the United States); see also 
Country Profiles, OPENNET INITIATIVE, http://opennet.net/country-profiles (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2012) (numerous examples of countries ordering Internet service providers to 
block certain websites).  For the term ―Internet service provider‖ as used in this article 
see infra note 61 and the accompanying text. 
 6 The term ―website operator‖ describes any entity that runs its own website.  This 
term is to be distinguished from ―Internet service provider.‖ See infra note 61 and 
accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
 8 The 2010 Internet-Draft of the Geographic Location/Privacy (geopriv) group of the 
Internet Engineering Task Force has noted that ―[a]s the accuracy of location information 
improves and the expense of calculating and obtaining it declines, the distribution and use 
of location information in Internet-based services will likely become increasingly 
pervasive.‖ Barnes et al., An Architecture for Location and Location Privacy in Internet 
Applications: Internet-Draft, GEOPRIV4 (Oct. 11, 2010), http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/draft-ietf-
geopriv-arch-03.pdf; see also A. Mayrhofer & C. Spanring, A Uniform Resource 
Identifier for Geographic Locations (‗geo‘ URI), INTERNET ENG‘G TASK FORCE 4, (June 
2010), http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc5870.txt.pdf (―Most web search engines 
use geographic information, and a vivid open source mapping community has brought an 
enormous momentum into location aware technology.‖). 
 9 See Benjamin Edelman, Shortcomings and Challenges in the Restriction of Internet 
Retransmissions of Over-the-Air Television Content to Canadian Internet Users 9 (2001), 
available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/archived_ content/people/edelman/pubs/jump-
091701.pdf (expert memorandum attached to the National Association of Broadcasters‘ 
submission to Industry Canada) (―The availability of exclusive high-value content 
protected by geographic analysis systems would be likely to encourage additional efforts 
at circumvention via proxy servers.‖). 
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make territorially-limited regulation and enforcement on the 
Internet even more difficult. 
The seminal question for regulating the use of cybertravel is 
whether it should be allowed at all, considering its potential to 
severely undermine the current trajectory of regulation and 
enforcement on the Internet.  The most straightforward manner of 
addressing the potentially subversive effect of cybertravel is to 
make it illegal.  Absent cybertravel, geolocation tools would face 
minimal or negligible obstacles and national regulation and 
enforcement on the Internet could emulate that of the physical 
world. 
This article supports the survival of cybertravel with specific 
limitations.  It argues that cybertravel should be equated to 
physical travel, and advocates that the legality of cybertravel 
should be protected for the same reasons for which we value the 
freedom of physical travel.  The importance of physical travel, 
including international travel, which in the United States is 
underscored by constitutional protections,
10
 emanates from its 
benefits to society, not the least of which is the access to 
information about alternative views and practices.
11
  People who 
travel learn about views held by others and various solutions to 
social problems, regulation, and enforcement.  Travel can inspire, 
teach, and facilitate an understanding of other societies, and assist 
in securing a peaceful co-existence of nations.
12
  In the near future, 
cybertravel will play a role very similar to that of physical travel as 
cyberspace becomes as partitioned as the physical world.  Even if 
this partitioning is the result of the imposition of reasonable 
jurisdictional limits on the Internet, it is questionable whether the 
resulting borders should be less permeable than the borders of the 
physical world. 
 
 10 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958); see infra Part IV.B.3. 
 11 Id. at 125–27 (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 
CONSTITUTION OF 1787 195–96 (University of Kansas Press 1956)).  On the right to 
access to information, see infra Part IV.B.3. 
 12 Id. at 127 (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 
CONSTITUTION OF 1787 195–96 (University of Kansas Press 1956)). 
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This article analyzes cybertravel and its current status, and 
projects its future.  Part I discusses the notion of the 
―borderlessness‖ of the Internet, its origins, development, and 
current state.  Part II discusses one of the methods used today to 
defeat Internet borderlessness and allow the erection of borders; 
the method—arguably the preferred of the existing methods of the 
territorial partitioning of the Internet
13—relies on geolocation tools 
to partition cyberspace.  Part II explains how geolocation tools 
work, who uses them and for what purposes.  Part III focuses on 
the use of cybertravel as the evasion of geolocation.  It reviews the 
various methods of cybertravel and provides examples of its uses. 
Part IV analyzes the legality of cybertravel as it exists today and 
proposes approaches that the law could take to cybertravel in the 
future; it also discusses possible technological and business 
solutions that may make cybertravel possible notwithstanding the 
developments that appear to preordain cybertravel‘s illegality. 
It should be noted that two topics are peripheral to the primary 
focus of this article.
14
  Although the article touches upon the two 
topics—anonymization and place-shifting services—they are not 
its primary focus.  Although it may appear that the problem of 
achieving anonymity on the Internet (or anonymous Internet 
browsing) is related to the legal issues of cybertravel, 
anonymization is in fact neither a prerequisite for nor a 
consequence of the legalization of cybertravel.  The relationship 
between the two phenomena is analyzed in Part IV,
15
 but this 
article provides no answers to questions about anonymization.  
Place-shifting services, which either retransmit television programs 
 
 13 Another method of erecting borders on the Internet is the filtering imposed by 
Internet service providers.  Internet service provider filtering prevents users from 
accessing content that has been blocked by the provider.  The most controversial method 
consists of installing a filter on users‘ hardware. See infra Part I (discussing methods of 
erecting borders on the Internet).  For the definition of ―Internet service provider‖ as used 
in this article, see infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 14 In attempting to cover a broad scope of various legal issues that pertain to 
cybertravel, this article inevitably generalizes and omits in-depth analyses of some issues 
deserving separate detailed inquiries (e.g., issues of personal jurisdiction and the legal 
status of cache copies).  Such inquiries are beyond the scope of this article. 
 15 On the relationship (or the absence thereof) of anonymization and cybertravel see 
infra Part IV.B.2. 
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themselves (e.g., ivi in the United States,
16
 TV CatchUP in the 
United Kingdom,
17
 shiftTV in Germany,
18
 and ManekiTV in 
Japan),
19
 or enable users to share retransmission of television 
programs (e.g., Justin.tv
20
 and WorldTV),
21
 resemble cybertravel 
because they also secure access to content in places where the 
content is normally not available.
22
  Although recent legal disputes 
concerning these services
23
 may be the precursors to legal 
challenges to cybertravel, legal issues that concern place-shifting 
services do not coincide with but only overlap with the issues 
associated with cybertravel.
24
 
 
 16 IVI, http://www.ivi.tv/faq (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
 17 TVCATCHUP, http://www.tvcatchup.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
 18 SHIFTTV, http://www.shift.tv (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
 19 MANEKITV, http://www.manekitv.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
 20 JUSTIN.TV, http://www.justin.tv (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).  According to its CEO, 
Michael Seibel, Justin.tv ―provide[s] a platform that empowers people to create and share 
live video online. Our site is the modern equivalent of the town square, but instead of 
standing on a soap box to be heard a user can broadcast his or her message to the world.‖ 
Piracy of Live Sports Broadcasting over the Internet: Hearing before the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 25 (2009) (Statement of Michael Seibel, CEO, Justin.tv, Inc.). 
 21 WORLDTV, http://worldtv.com/pages (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).  
 22 For a reference to Slingbox, another non-cybertravel service that offers access to 
territorially-limited content, see infra note 259. 
 23 See, e.g., WPIX, Inc. v. Ivi, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Toshiko 
Aritake, Top Court Says Retransmission of Network TV Content Violates Copyrights, 25 
WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. (BNA) 16 (Jan. 25, 2011); ITV Broad. Ltd. v. TV CatchUp 
Ltd., [2010] EWHC (Ch) 3063; ITV Broad. Ltd. v. TV CatchUp Ltd.,  [2011] EWHC 
(Pat) 1874; and ITV Broad. Ltd. v. TV CatchUp Ltd., [2011] EWHC (Pat) 2977; 
Bundesgerichtshof, [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Apr. 22, 2009, MEDIEN, INTERNET 
UND RECHT [MIR] 173, 2009 (Ger.) (Shift.tv).  The Ultimate Fighting Championship filed 
a lawsuit against Justin.tv on January 21, 2011. Complaint, Zuffa, LLC v. Justin.tv, Inc., 
No. 2:11-cv-00114-RLH-LRL (D. Nev. filed Jan. 21, 2011). See also Piracy of Live 
Sports Broadcasting over the Internet: Hearing before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. 25 (2009) (statement of Michael Seibel, CEO, Justin.tv, Inc.); see also infra Part 
IV.A.2. 
 24 First, because of the manner in which the technology involved in cybertravel 
functions, as opposed to the manner in which place-shifting tools that are mentioned here 
function, cybertravel might not be viewed as a retransmission of content to a new (not 
originally intended) audience.  Second, even if the differences in technology are 
considered irrelevant to an inquiry about the existence of liability for copyright 
infringement, not all legal issues relevant to cases of cybertravel would apply to place-
shifting services.  Although users do cybertravel to watch video content not available in 
their country or region, this is not the only purpose for which they cybertravel, and 
therefore limiting the present inquiry to this one aspect of cybertravel would most 
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I. THE INTERNET AS A BORDERLESS MEDIUM25 
At its birth, the Internet was endowed with an architecture that 
sounded very appealing: the medium would be designed so that no 
one authority could assert complete control over it.
26
  This design 
idea shaped the creation of the Arpanet, the predecessor of the 
Internet,
27
 as a decentralized network that would become the basis 
of the structure of the Internet.  This deliberate design led to a 
network that not only defied central control but also lacked borders 
for partitioning control territorially; one of the network‘s defining 
features was the absence of any borders.  Dan Jerker B. 
Svantesson, who has worked on the legal problems associated with 
the Internet‘s borderlessness and issues of geolocation for a 
number of years,
28
 calls borderlessness ―one of [the Internet‘s] 
 
certainly not exhaust all the legal issues associated with cybertravel, and the limitation 
would render the legal analysis of cybertravel incomplete. See infra Part IV.A.2 for the 
discussion of various legal aspects concerning cybertravel.  For the legal issues of the 
streaming of content on the Internet, see Maurizio Borghi, Chasing Copyright 
Infringement in the Streaming Landscape, 42 INT‘L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. LAW 
316 (2011). 
 25 The word ―Internet‖ technically refers to only one of the network protocols; 
however, given the prevailing use of the protocol and the fact that it has been equated to 
the network itself, this paper talks only about the Internet.  On the two current versions of 
the protocol see infra Part II.B. 
 26 See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD 23 (Oxford University Press 2006) (―[T]he founders embraced a 
design that distrusted centralized control. In effect, they built strains of American 
libertarianism, and even 1960s idealism, into the universal language of the Internet.‖); 
INSTRUCTIONAL DESIGN: SYSTEM, STRATEGIES 167 (Bruce R. Ledford, Phillip J. Sleeman, 
eds.) (―Primarily because of the needs inherent in the cold war, it became obvious to the 
Military and Department of Defense that the ability to wage modern warfare had to be 
decentralized.‖); see also Paul Baran, On Distributed Communications: I. Introduction to 
Distributed Communications Networks, RAND CORP. (Aug. 1964), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/2006/RM3420.pdf.  
 27 See generally JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET (MIT Press 2000) 
(discussing the creation and early days of the Internet); see also GOLDSMITH & WU, supra 
note 26, at 22–23. 
 28 Svantesson has written about geolocation since 2003. Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, 
How Does the Accuracy of Geo-Location Technologies Affect the Law, 2 MASARYK U. J. 
L. & T. 11, 20 (2008), available at http://mujlt.law.muni.cz/storage/1234798550 
_sb_02_svantesson.pdf [hereinafter Svantesson, The Accuracy of Geo-Location]. A 
number of Svantesson‘s papers related to geolocation are available on his website. 
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greatest attributes.‖29  This Part discusses this feature of the 
Internet, its origins, its impact on the Internet and regulation of the 
Internet, and its current state and future. 
Robert Taylor, a former Director of the Information Processing 
Techniques Office of the Advanced Research Project Agency, the 
agency that developed the Arpanet in the late 1960s, attributed the 
idea for the particular architecture of the Arpanet (that led to the 
borderlessness of the Internet) to Wesley Clark, an electrical 
engineer who worked for Washington University in St. Louis 
during that time.  Taylor recalled that the decision to support 
Clark‘s idea was related to Taylor‘s own skepticism of central 
authority; his experience from the Vietnam War convinced him 
that any central authority should not be trusted, so he agreed with a 
plan to establish the network with no central control.
30
  In fact, 
however, the Department of Defense also had its own reasons for 
being interested in a decentralized architecture; such an 
architecture was more likely to withstand an enemy attack.
31
  
Therefore, the distributed architecture of the network was not a 
matter of coincidence,
32
 nor was it dictated by technical necessity; 
 
SVANTESSON.ORG, http://www.svantesson.org/projects/geo-identification/articles--papers-
relating-to-geo-identification.aspx (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
 29 Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, ―Imagine There‘s No Countries…‖—Geo-Identification, 
the Law, and the Not-So-Borderless Internet, 10 J. INTERNET L. 1, 1, 20 (2007). 
 30 Computer History Museum, Net @ 40: Robert W. Taylor in Conversation with 
National Public Radio‘s Guy Raz, YOUTUBE (May 13, 2010), http://www.youtube. 
com/computerhistory#p/search/0/Y0MsrrTo8jY (―Other people who were thinking about 
the networking architecture as we would design it were imagining central locations for a 
single computer in the middle of the country that would control the network all over the 
country.  What a stupid idea!  I knew it was a stupid idea but I did not have a better one. 
Wes[ley] Clark had a better one.‖).  For Taylor‘s recollections of his experience from the 
Vietnam War era, see id.; see also John Markoff, Control the Internet? A Futile Pursuit, 
Some Say, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2005, at C4, available at http://www.nytimes.com 
/2005/11/14/business/14register.html?_r=2 (discussing Taylor‘s recollections); see also 
Jonathan Zittrain, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 28–35 (2008) 
(explaining the beginnings of the Internet in general).  
 31 Baran, supra note 26. 
 32 Cf. DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON‘S MOOSE: NOTES ON THE STATE OF 
CYBERSPACE 103 (2009) (―Perhaps it was a coincidence that the network that became ‗the 
Internet‘ was the one that operated this way: end-to-end, innovations coming from the 
edges via this strange kind of creeping consensus among users, no centralized control.  I 
doubt it, though.‖). 
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the particular architecture had significant political and strategic 
motivations.
33
 
The technical design of the Internet has a critical impact on the 
power of governments to impose regulation and enforcement in the 
space.
34
  To regulate a territory, a government needs to exert its 
enforcement power in the territory, or have other governments 
wield this power on its behalf.  The willingness—or lack thereof—
of foreign governments to lend their support to enforcing one 
government‘s regulations defines the limits of the power of that 
government to regulate.  The problem in a borderless world is that 
if a government has the physical ability to enforce its will, for 
instance, because Internet servers are located in its territory,
35
 it 
ultimately regulates and enforces worldwide; other governments 
cannot push back,
36
 and the regulating and enforcing power of the 
one country thus extends to the world‘s entire cyberspace.37  On 
the other hand, if a government cannot enforce its regulations 
because particular servers, server providers, website operators or 
their assets are located outside of that government‘s enforcement 
 
 33 Computer History Museum, supra note 30, at 1:17:25 (noting that the fact that ―the 
Arpanet was deliberately heavily decentralized . . . came from political motivations as 
well as technical motivations.‖). 
 34 Id. at 1:12:21 (Taylor claims that the creators of the Arpanet realized that its 
borderlessness would not be limited to the United States but would extend globally.  He 
recalls that it did not appear that ―anyone who worked on [the Arpanet] in those days 
thought it would be limited to the United States.‖). 
 35 The physical presence of the website operator or its assets does not have to be in the 
country of enforcement; servers may be targets of enforcement actions instead. Cf. Jack 
L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1217 (1998) (―A 
defendant‘s physical presence or assets within the territory remains the primary basis for 
a nation or state to enforce its laws.‖). 
 36 Governments may try to build walls on the Internet that will keep certain content out 
of their territory; however, filtering is associated with a number of problems.  The U.S. 
government is using its enforcement power over ―related actors‖ (Internet service 
providers, payment processors, etc.) to enforce its laws, but U.S. legislative initiatives 
that target such related actors are not without controversy. See infra notes 59–65 and 
accompanying text. 
 37  Anupam Chander, Trade 2.0, 34 YALE J. INT‘l L. 281, 285 (2009) (―Left 
unattended, footloose net-work might imperil domestic laws, replacing local law with the 
regulation, if any, of the net-work provider‘s home state . . . [T]he importing of services 
should not require us to import law as well.‖). 
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power, that government‘s regulatory power is nonexistent38 unless 
the government manages to exert its power over Internet users 
residing in its territory or other actors located in its territory.  Such 
actors may include service providers and payment processors, or 
anyone that facilitates the operations of the website operators.
39
 
When the Internet became a mass medium, the initial desire to 
have no central authority controlling the network was replaced by a 
realization that non-regulation in cyberspace might create more 
problems than the socially valuable opportunities that this 
architecture might offer.  Some questioned whether the Internet 
was susceptible to any regulation at all.  It is not surprising that the 
disadvantages of non-regulation on the Internet were identified by 
someone who personally observed the regulatory disarray in the 
post-communist countries.  Lawrence Lessig, who was engaged as 
an advisor to these countries,
40
 suggested a need for governance on 
the Internet and posited that the regulation should be based on the 
―code‖—the architecture of the Internet, the technical design that 
de facto regulates behavior on the Internet.
41
  The architecture 
would dictate to a large degree what the law could do, and be the 
―code,‖ not only in the technical sense, but to a certain degree also 
in the legal sense.
42
  If governments wished to regulate the Internet 
 
 38 See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 4, at 789–90 (describing a potential hurdle to 
interstate enforcement within the United States associated with the lack of physical 
borders on the Internet and therefore with the danger of territorially-unlimited 
prescriptive jurisdiction). 
 39 Targeting ―related actors‖—actors that are linked to providers of certain content—
can raise concerns that are similar to those that are raised by filtering. See infra note 59 
(describing the proposed Stop Online Piracy Act in the United States, which would target 
such related actors). 
 40 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE, AND OTHER LAWS oF CYBERSPACE 3 (Basic Books 1999). 
 41 See Michael Geist, Cyberlaw 2.0, 44 B.C. L. REV. 323, 357 (2003) (―[T]he three 
principles of Cyberlaw 1.0 . . . are in fact tied together by one larger principle—that 
government would not, could not, and should not apply its traditional regulatory 
mechanisms to the Internet.‖). 
 42 WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, CITY OF BITS: SPACE, PLACE AND THE INFOBAHN 111 (1996) 
(discussing the famous ―code is the law‖); Christoph B. Graber, Internet Creativity, 
Communicative Freedom and a Constitutional Rights Theory Response to ―Code is 
Law‖, at 5 (The Research Centre for International Communications and Art Law at the 
University of Lucerne, Working Paper No. 2010/03), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1737630 (correctly pointing out that Lessig ―does not equalise 
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they would have to utilize its architecture—its ―code‖ in the 
technical sense; at the same time, the architecture would protect 
the Internet from government imposition of laws inconsistent with 
the structure of the network.
43
  The solution to the problem of 
regulation on the Internet would have to be predicated on its 
architecture. 
If conduct on the Internet should and could be regulated, the 
question then was who should regulate it.  One school of thought 
declared that no one should regulate conduct on the Internet,
44
 
although the ―no one‖ did not really mean a complete absence of 
regulation.  Because the technical ―code‖ is a significant regulatory 
tool, it is clear that the ―no one‖ would be the Internet designers, 
who continue to shape the Internet and its de facto technical 
regulatory framework.
45
  Although Internet designers would 
always have an important role to play in the Internet‘s future, 
including the Internet‘s susceptibility to certain types of regulation, 
there seems to be no legitimate reason that they should dictate the 
full scope of the ―code‖ in the legal sense.46  Despite their 
―parental claims,‖ Internet designers would not be the proper 
 
‗law‘ and ‗code;‘‖ rather, he ―defines ‗code‘ as a form of co-action between software and 
hardware on the Internet constituting an architecture of technology,‖ which ―is a 
structure that conditions regulation on the Internet.‖). 
 43 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 3 (Basic Books 2006) (―The claim for 
cyberspace was not just that governments would not regulate cyberspace—it was that 
government could not regulate cyberspace.‖). 
 44 John Perry Barlow, Declaration of Cyberspace Independence, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Davos, Switzerland 1996), available at https://projects.eff.org/ ~barlow/ 
Declaration-Final.html. 
 45 Graber, supra note 42, at 5 (―[T]he actor who reigns over the architecture of 
technology also defines the rights and constraints existing within this architecture.‖).  
 46 LESSIG, supra note 40, at 8 (There were advocates of an expert-centered approach: 
―We are at a stage in our history when we urgently need to make fundamental choices 
about values, but we should trust no institution of government to make such choices.‖); 
GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 26, at 30 (―Internet‘s founding vision [was] of an open, 
noncommercial network run by selfless experts for the benefit of all.‖).  Of course, given 
many people‘s disillusions with the choices of democratic governments perhaps it would 
be better to entrust regulation to independent experts; however, such an approach to 
shaping the ―code‖ should have a democratic oversight unless we want to abandon 
democracy altogether. See also Graber, supra note 42, at 6 (discussing the need to subject 
to constitutional scrutiny not only governmental but also private actions manipulating 
Internet infrastructure). 
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authority to make all the regulatory choices for life in 
cyberspace.
47
 
Those who have agreed on the need to regulate in cyberspace 
have been divided between those who have predicted a special new 
type of regulation for the Internet,
48
 and those who have rejected 
any specificity for the medium and have insisted that the Internet 
be subject to the same regulations that apply to conduct occurring 
in other means of communication.  The first group, the Internet 
exceptionalists, call for new bodies to be established to govern 
cyberspace.
49
  The second group, the Internet non-exceptionalists, 
have seen no reason to discuss who should govern cyberspace 
because in their view the Internet should be subject to existing 
regulation.
50
 
With the increasing population of cyberspace and a growing 
spectrum of activities taking place on the Internet, the world did 
not wait for a resolution of the debate among the Internet 
designers, the exceptionalists, and the non-exceptionalists.  As 
Michael Geist observed in 2003, the innocent age of the Internet 
 
 47 In fact, the ―code‖ in the technical sense cannot serve as the only regulatory 
framework in cyberspace; there are limitations of the ―code‖ in the technical sense and a 
need for it to be supported by other forms of regulation. See Barnes et al., supra note 8, at 
6–7. 
 48 GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 26, at 25 (The options include ―the internationalists‘ 
view‖ that ―territorial rule would need to be supplemented, and eventually replaced, by 
global governmental institutions.‖). Another option is for the Internet community to 
govern itself independently of national governments. See POST, supra note 32, at 185 
(―[I]t‘s all just people in one place interacting and communicating with other people in 
other places.  So why not begin by recognizing their right–perhaps even their inalienable 
right?–to govern themselves as they see fit?‖). 
 49 David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders–The Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996) (―This . . . distinct Cyberspace . . . 
needs and can create its own law and legal institutions.‖). 
 50 See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 4, at 827 (―The error is the belief that the 
Internet is a unique phenomenon that requires suspension of the normal principles that 
govern cross-border conduct.‖); Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1250 (―Cyberspace 
transactions are no different from ‗real-space‘ transnational transactions. . . . There is no 
general normative argument that supports the immunization of cyberspace activities from 
territorial regulation. . . . Resolution of the choice-of-law problems presented by 
cyberspace transactions will be challenging, but no more challenging than similar 
problems raised in other transnational contexts.‖); see also POST, supra note 32, at 166–
67 (discussing exceptionalists‘ versus non-exceptionalists‘ views). 
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was replaced by the rule of ―cyberlaw 2.0,‖ which confirmed the 
views and predictions of the non-exceptionalists, and ―[brought] 
with it a shift from a borderless network to borderless law, from 
code that regulates to code that is regulated, and from self-
regulation to government regulation.‖51  History proved that the 
borderless network would not have to mean the end of 
governmental control or the end of regulation and enforcement, but 
that it would be transformed into a borderless regulation supported 
by unilateral and yet globally-reaching enforcement.
52
 
Once governments began to engage in de facto global 
enforcement on the Internet, the borderlessness of the network no 
longer appeared to be an advantage, and the desirability of borders 
began to be re-evaluated.  This development can be perceived as a 
logical result of the maturing of both the Internet and some of its 
advocates; or, a much less encouraging explanation suggests that 
the interest in raising borders on the Internet was one of the signs 
of the inevitable ―Cycle‖ that Tim Wu has described in various 
industries and great inventions
53—the ―Cycle‖ that turns amazing, 
groundbreaking inventions into the tools of vicious monopolies.
54
  
And, counter-intuitively, raising borders may in fact assist such 
monopolies in asserting their power globally: while without 
 
 51 Geist, supra note 41, at 358. 
 52 Id. at 335–47 (Geist listed examples of ―aggressive extra-territorial legislative 
approach‖ in the areas of copyright, domain names regulation, privacy, computer crime, 
and online gambling.); see also Jack Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding 
Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475, 483 (1998) 
(an earlier piece by Jack Goldsmith predicting cyberlaw 2.0).  
 53 TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 6 
(2010) (―Without exception, the brave new technologies of the twentieth century–free use 
of which was originally encouraged, for the sake of further invention and individual 
expression–eventually evolved into privately controlled industrial behemoths, the ‗old 
media‘ giants of the twenty-first, through which the flow and nature of content would be 
strictly controlled for reasons of commerce.‖). 
 54 Id. at 7 (―If the Internet, whose present openness has become a way of life, should 
prove as much subject to the Cycle as every other information network before it, the 
practical consequences will be staggering.‖); see also GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 26, 
at 10 (―By 2005 Yahoo had come full circle. The darling of the Internet free speech 
movement had become an agent of thought control for the Chinese government. . . . The 
Yahoo story encapsulates the Internet‘s transformation from a technology that resists 
territorial law to one that facilitates its enforcement.‖). 
  
582 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:567 
borders those who hold monopolies in only some countries face 
competition on the Internet from foreign competitors, with borders 
the monopoly holders may fully occupy the space. 
Although it may seem at first that raising Internet borders is 
inherently undesirable, the fact is that raising borders may be as 
liberating as it is limiting.
55
 The geographically unlimited 
regulation and enforcement of cyberlaw 2.0 has been liberating 
only when it is ―our‖ laws that are being enforced; as soon as other 
countries enforce ―their‖ laws that are contrary to our beliefs, we 
begin to look for ways to protect our own value system.
56
  We 
might not always agree with our government‘s actions, but at least 
we have the option of influencing them.  Having foreign 
governments imposing regulations on us that we cannot affect 
makes us reconsider the value of borders,
57
 and contemplate 
ending the borderlessness of the Internet.
58
 
 
 55 Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 4, at 796–97 (discussing benefits of territorially-
limited or geographically-defined regulations). 
 56 GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 26, at 152 (―A bordered Internet is valuable precisely 
because it permits people of different value systems to coexist on the same planet.‖). See, 
e.g., Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L‘Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 
1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001),  rev‘d en banc, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006); Sarl Louis Feraud 
Int‘l. v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2007). But cf. Government Domain Name 
Siezures Violate First Amendment, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 21, 2011), 
https://www.eff.org/press/archives/2011/06/20 (describing reactions to the seizures of 
domain names by the U.S. government in response to allegations of providing access to 
counterfeited or copyright-infringing content).  According to a BNA report, between 
2009 and February 2011 ―[t]he government has seized nearly 100 domains.‖ John 
Herzfeld, Domains Seized by Authorities for Publishing Hyperlinks to Unauthorized 
Streaming Video, BNA, Feb. 9, 2011; see also Federal Courts Order Seizure of 150 
Website Domains Involved in Selling Counterfeit Goods as Part of DOJ, ICE HSI and 
FBI Cyber Monday Crackdown, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 28, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/November/11-ag-1540.html (describing seizures of 
domain names). 
 57 ―[C]ontrary to what many expect, the geographically bordered Internet has many 
underappreciated virtues. . . .  The bordered Internet accommodates real and important 
differences among peoples in different places, and makes the Internet a more effective 
and useful communication tool as a result.‖ GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 26, at viii. 
 58 It also transpired that businesses did not respond to cyberlaw 2.0 by moving their 
seats, servers and assets to jurisdictions with limited regulation and enforcement.  The 
absence of the feared ―race to the bottom‖ may be explained by the global nature of large 
businesses for which operating against local regulations is extremely disadvantageous; 
they may have assets in multiple countries, which they need to protect from potential 
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There are three methods of imposing borders on the Internet: 
the first two methods rely on content filtering and the third relies 
on the actions of website operators.
59
  Content filters can be 
installed directly on a user‘s hardware or applied at the level of 
Internet service providers
60—those who connect users to the 
Internet, such as cable companies, telephone companies, and 
wireless service providers.
61
  The first filtering method—hardware 
content filtering—is highly controversial; the second method—
service provider content filtering—is applied not only by 
oppressive regimes but also by democratic countries,
62
 and 
certainly has merit when used to enforce decisions by courts or 
administrative agencies.
63
  However, unless it is based on a 
 
enforcement actions, or they do not want to lose existing markets as a result of their own 
non-compliance, or they want to preserve their option to enter into prospective markets in 
the future.  Additionally, many smaller businesses do not have the resources to relocate 
their operations to avoid regulation; therefore, no exodus to minimum-regulation 
jurisdictions occurred.  Instead, many actors on the Internet strive to comply with local 
regulation and employ geolocation tools to achieve that goal. 
 59 Not all enforcement of laws on the Internet relies on the territorial partitioning of the 
Internet. See, e.g., Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 102(c)(2)(C) (2011) 
(proposing to bar online payment providers from doing business with websites that 
breach the law). Such proposals raise a number of issues, including their potential 
extraterritorial effects. 
 60 See infra notes 320–22 and accompanying text (on filtering by service providers); 
see also FREEDOM ON THE NET: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF INTERNET AND DIGITAL MEDIA  
6–7 (Sanja Kelly & Sarah Cook eds., Freedom House, 2011).  
 61 The term ―Internet service provider‖ as used here does not match the statutorily 
defined term ―service provider.‖ See 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1) (2010) (defining ―service 
provider‖ to cover a wider range of entities). 
 62 See Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Documentation of Internet Filtering 
Worldwide, BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC‘Y-HARV. L. SCH., http://cyber.law. 
harvard.edu/filtering/ (last updated Oct. 24, 2003). 
 63 For instance, a court may order Internet service providers to block access to a 
website that does not comply with a court‘s decision according to local regulations 
against pornography.  It is more problematic if a government requests that service 
providers filter for pornography and block the content without any formal proceedings to 
establish the illegality of the particular content. See also Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp. v. British Telecomms. PLC, [2011] EWHC (Ch) 2714 (Eng.) (for a decision in the 
context of copyright infringement); Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual 
exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework 
Decision 2004/68/JHA, art. 25(2), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:335:0001:0014:EN:PDF. 
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decision concerning particular individual content, no type of 
content filtering appears to be an acceptable means for achieving 
routine compliance with local laws and regulations; usually, these 
methods of filtering are viewed by the public with significant 
skepticism, if not outrage.  Academics have argued that the two 
types of filtering should be prohibited as being contrary to the 
freedom of speech,
64
 and recently the Court of Justice of the 
European Union ruled that court-imposed, time-unlimited, general 
filtering violates the European Union Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and other EU legislation.
65
 
The third method of raising borders on the Internet leaves the 
burden upon responsible website operators
66
 and requires that they 
take actions necessary to comply with territorially-defined 
obligations.  This method has several advantages.  First, it avoids 
the public outrage associated with governmental intrusions into 
Internet traffic
67
 and potential constitutional and human rights 
challenges that can arise because the intrusions may have the 
character of censorship of speech.
68
  Second, the method relies on 
 
 64 See infra notes 319–22 and accompanying text; infra Part IV.B.3. 
 65 See Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs 
et Éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document 
/document.jsf?text=&docid=115202&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=
first&part=1&cid=763036.  The CJEU noted that the filtering at issue would violate the 
rights of not only Internet users—―their right to protection of their personal data and their 
freedom to receive or impart information,‖—but also Internet service providers—―the 
freedom to conduct business.‖ Id. at ¶¶  49, 50.  The filtering was also held to be in 
breach of the EU E-Commerce Directive (Directive 2000/31/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information 
society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market) and other 
related EU directives. Id. at ¶ 54; see case C-360/10, Belgische Vereinigung van Auteurs, 
Componisten en Uitgevers (SABAM) v. Netlog NV (2012); see also infra note 67. 
 66 See supra note 6 (defining the term ―website operator‖ as used in this article). 
 67 See, e.g., Björn Greif, Löschen Statt Sperren: Bundesregierung Kippt 
Zugangserschwerungsgesetz, ZDNET (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.zdnet.de/news/digitale_ 
wirtschaft_internet_ebusiness_loeschen_statt_sperren_bundesregierung_kippt_zugangser
schwerungsgesetz_story-39002364-41551361-1.htm (describing the recent developments 
surrounding Zugangserschwerungsgesetz in Germany and the Digital Economy Act in the 
United Kingdom); Josh Halliday, Digital Economy Act: Filesharing Code Delayed by Six 
Months, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2011), http://guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/apr/05/ 
digital-economy-act-filesharing. 
 68 See infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the constitutional aspect of the problem). 
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the parties who actually know the content of the website at any 
given moment and who should be able to assess their legal 
obligations in various territorial contexts.
69
  Third, the method does 
not challenge the status of Internet service providers as common 
carriers eligible for safe harbors that protect them from secondary 
liability.
70
  The safe harbors are based on the theory that common 
carriers are unaware of the content that they carry and are 
technically incapable of efficient monitoring of the content that 
would allow them to prevent direct infringements.  If governments 
require and service providers execute the filtering of certain 
content, the common carrier status could be in jeopardy. 
The third method of raising borders on the Internet through 
website operators is arguably preferable to the second method that 
relies on filtering by Internet service providers; website operators 
are better positioned to limit access to their websites to users from 
certain countries or block access to users from other countries.  
Website operators have utilized geolocation tools to achieve this 
goal. 
 
 69 The situation is more complicated when operators, such as eBay or YouTube, 
provide space for users to post their own content; the degree to which such operators are 
able to monitor the content uploaded by the users is subject to debate. E.g., Content ID, 
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).  For a 
choice-of-law perspective on the problem of potential operator liability for the conduct of 
users, see generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie et al., The Law Applicable to Secondary 
Liability in Intellectual Property Cases, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 201 (2009). See 
also Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs Compositeurs et 
Éditeurs (2011), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf? 
text=&docid=115202&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=1
&cid=64604. 
 70 Internet service providers, or website operators operating search engines or public 
fora for users‘ content, would not be the responsible parties if their liability is limited by 
a safe harbor provision. See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 
512(g)(2) (2010); Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006); Directive 
2001/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain 
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the 
Internal Market, arts. 12–15, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 3. 
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II. GEOLOCATION TOOLS 
Before the next Part discusses cybertravel as the evasion of 
geolocation, this Part reviews what geolocation tools are, who uses 
them and for what purposes, and how the tools operate.  As 
explained earlier, geolocation tools have become one of the means 
of erecting borders on the Internet; the tools can determine where 
an Internet user is physically located and allow tailored content to 
be delivered to that user based on the local regulatory framework 
and other localized preferences.  Currently these tools utilize 
Internet protocol (―IP‖) addresses71 to localize Internet users; 
however, in the future, geolocation tools might not need to rely on 
IP addresses at all or solely on IP addresses
72—additional or 
different data points may serve as sources of information about an 
Internet user‘s location. 
A. Use of Geolocation Tools 
If we regard the territorial partitioning of the Internet as an 
undesirable outcome (meaning detrimental to the original idea of 
the network),
73
 the story behind geolocation tools might indeed be 
another example of Tim Wu‘s vicious ―Cycle‖74 because these 
tools—like other technologies subject to Wu‘s ―Cycle‖—had 
innocent beginnings.  Apparently, the first desire to find out where 
Internet users were located arose in the advertising industry when 
advertisers wanted to target advertisements based on a user‘s 
location.
75
  So, if you opened a page on your home computer, the 
advertisers wanted you to be offered meals at your local 
restaurants; if you opened the same page on your laptop while 
connected to the Internet at a Chicago airport, the advertisers 
wanted you to see advertisements for local Chicago restaurants.  
 
 71 See infra Part II.B (explaining the term ―IP address‖). 
 72 See infra notes 163–64 and accompanying text. 
 73 ―The bordered Internet is widely viewed to be a dreadful development that is 
antithetical to the Internet‘s ‗true‘ purposes and undermines the Internet‘s promise.‖ 
GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 26, at 150. 
 74 See Wu, supra note 53; supra Part I. 
 75 ―To the best of my knowledge, commercial Internet-based geographic analysis tools 
have been available since no later than 1999 . . . .‖ Edelman, supra note 9, at 2.  On the 
history of geolocation see GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 26, at 58–61. 
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Although it might be annoying to some that connecting to the 
Internet during a short layover at the Frankfurt airport results in 
Google assuming that you wish to use the German version of their 
search engine,
76
 the general Internet population appears to prefer 
the convenience of localized content.
77
 
After they were applied in advertising, geolocation tools began 
to be employed by those who were attempting to comply with 
territorially-defined regulation.  Regulation continues to be 
territorial; even in highly internationally-harmonized areas such as 
copyright, differences among the laws of countries persist, so it is 
desirable to tailor the accessibility of content on the Internet to the 
requirements and limitations of individual countries.  Website 
operators use geolocation tools to comply with various regulatory 
requirements—for instance, to satisfy restrictions that the U.S. 
government imposes on exports to certain countries.
78
  Companies 
may use geolocation tools to prevent customers from certain 
countries from ordering electronic equipment because of safety 
requirements that the particular country imposes on such 
equipment sold for use in that country.  Even if parties regulate 
their affairs between themselves by private contract—for instance, 
 
 76 Although the German version of the website appears automatically, you can 
manually switch it back to Google.com. 
 77 ―[T]he explosive growth of the World Wide Web is directly attributable to the 
invention of identification and filtering technologies that made it possible to organize and 
select from the morass of available information.‖ Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1228–29.  
―[G]eographical borders first emerged on the Internet not as a result of fiats by national 
governments, but rather organically, from below, because Internet users around the globe 
demanded different Internet experiences that corresponded to geography.‖ GOLDSMITH & 
WU, supra note 26, at 49.  On the various virtues of localized content, see id. at 50–53.  
Some website operators believe that users want websites to go even further and offer not 
only localized but also individualized content.  Thus, if you like Indian food, when 
connecting to the Internet from Chicago, not only will you see only ads for Chicago 
restaurants, but those ads will be limited to restaurants serving Indian food.   While 
localization of content may always be achieved by applying geolocation tools without 
retaining identifiable data on user behavior, individualization of content requires the 
collection and retention of identifiable data on individual users, which creates personal 
data protection issues. See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing anonymization). 
 78 Michael Geist mentioned that Microsoft was using geolocation tools ―to comply 
with U.S. regulations prohibiting the export of strong-encryption Web browser software.‖ 
Geist, supra note 41, at 334. 
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by obtaining a copyright license for certain content—their 
contracts may be limited territorially. 
Often the uses of geolocation serve multiple purposes.
79
  For 
example, online gaming websites use geolocation tools both to 
comply with local gaming regulations and to prevent fraud.
80
  First, 
geolocation is employed to help ensure that customers will not 
access gaming sites from countries that impose prohibitions or 
limitations on Internet gaming.
81
  William Hill, one of the largest 
bookmakers in the United Kingdom and also an online gaming 
operator, uses geolocation tools to prevent U.S. players from 
accessing its gaming products that are legal in the United 
Kingdom, but expose various entities involved in the operation to 
liability in the United States.
82
  The second purpose for which the 
gaming industry uses geolocation tools is to identify potential 
credit card fraud.
83
  If the address given to the issuing bank does 
 
 79 TV stations and other online content providers may have various reasons for limiting 
access to content from certain countries—copyright licensing issues are not the only 
reason. See infra note 180; see also Frequently Asked Questions: BBC Help, BBC 
http://faq.external.bbc.co.uk/questions/ bbc_online/website_changes (last visited July 28, 
2011).  As a result of these various limitations, for instance, you cannot access episodes 
of The Tonight Show when you are in Germany; the NBC website will not play the video 
once it detects your foreign location. THE TONIGHT SHOW, http://www.nbc.com/the-
tonight-show/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).  Similarly, the German television station 
SAT1 will not allow you to watch Kommissar Rex from a U.S. location; upon opening 
the webpage you will receive a message explaining that the content is not available in the 
United States. KOMMISSAR REX, http://www.sat1.de/filme_serien/rex/ (last visited Nov. 
19, 2011).  Users have reported that Netflix will not allow them to download a film if 
they access their U.S. Netflix account from a location outside the United States.  I am 
indebted to my colleague, Professor Stacey Tovino of the William S. Boyd School of 
Law, for the observation about Netflix.  Other Netflix users have reported the same 
problem. 
 80 See generally JULIA HÖRNLE & BRIGITTE ZAMMIT, CROSS-BORDER ONLINE 
GAMBLING LAW AND POLICY (2010); see also Tricia Lines Hill, Harnessing the Power to 
Stop Fraud, IVERTECH, http://software.ivertech.com/_ivertechArticle15229_ 
HarnessingthePowerto StopFraud.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
 81  I am indebted to Gregory R. Gemignani of Lionel Sawyer & Collins, Las Vegas, 
Nevada, for an insightful discussion about the uses of geolocation in the gaming industry.  
 82 WILLIAM HILL, http://casino.williamhill.com/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
 83 On geolocation in preventing credit card fraud see GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 26, 
at 61; see also Hill, supra note 80; Kevin F. King, Personal Jurisdiction, Internet 
Commerce, and Privacy: The Pervasive Legal Consequences of Modern Geolocation 
Technologies, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 61, 76 (2011). 
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not match the physical address that is self-reported by the Internet 
user at registration (as confirmed by the geolocation tools), the 
operator is alerted and may take additional measures to ensure that 
the player is a legitimate user of the credit card. 
The list of reasons for the voluntary use of geolocation tools 
goes beyond achieving legal compliance or preventing fraud, and 
includes purposes such as implementing differential pricing, 
localizing advertising, and Internet searching.  Of course, illegal 
operations also utilize the tools in support of their illegal 
activities.
84
  A Hong Kong website operator, who purposefully 
engaged in activities that appeared to infringe intellectual property 
rights, used the tools to limit the site‘s exposure to local authorities 
by making sure that it did not infringe any rights in Hong Kong.  
To meet this goal, the company employed geolocation tools to 
make sure that no user from Hong Kong could download an 
infringing work posted on its website, but simultaneously 
permitted users connected from other countries to download the 
content.
85
 
In an important development for the future of geolocation, and 
consequently also for the future of cybertravel, governments are 
turning to geolocation as an enforcement tool—a means to force 
Internet actors to comply with regulatory decisions and court 
orders.  For example, regulators in Italy have mandated that 
gaming websites use geolocation tools to prevent users located in 
Italy from accessing certain content.
86
  The U.S. Department of 
 
 84 For this example I am indebted to Douglas Clark of Hogan Lovells International 
LLP, Shanghai, China. 
 85 See MEGAUPLOAD, http://www.megaupload.com/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).  For 
information on cross-border enforcement difficulties in intellectual property cases see 
generally Marketa Trimble, Cross-Border Injunctions in U.S. Patent Cases and Their 
Enforcement Abroad, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 331 (2009) [hereinafter Trimble, 
Cross-Border Injunctions]; Marketa Trimble Landova, The Public Policy Exception to 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Cases of Copyright Infringement, 40 INTL. 
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 642 (2009). 
 86 According to NeuStar (formerly Quova), a geolocation tools provider, 
―[g]eolocation technology is a requirement in online licensing applications in Italy. . . . 
An operator wishing to obtain an online gaming licence in Italy is required to note during 
its license application the technology that will be used for geolocation. . . . The use of 
geolocation technology is required in order to enable an operator to identify the 
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Justice made it a condition of its agreement with PokerStars, an 
online gaming company operating from the Isle of Man,
87
 that the 
company ―utilize geographic blocking technology relating to I.P. 
addresses.‖88  In Germany, several courts have unequivocally 
accepted geolocation as ―a viable and technically feasible method 
of determining website visitors‘ location[s]‖89 and ordered online 
gaming operators to utilize geolocation tools to limit access to 
certain content from particular German states.
90
  Recent legislative 
efforts also show the need for clear jurisdictional borders on the 
Internet, whether they are efforts in the areas of Internet 
commerce
91
 or online gaming.
92
 
 
geographical origin of the player who attempts to access the gaming website.  This is 
needed in order to prevent Italians having access to non-authorised sites managed by the 
same operator. . . . France has studied Italy‘s model and has developed a similar system 
which is expected to come into force some time during the year.‖ NEUSTAR, Geolocation; 
Ensuring Compliance with Online Gaming Regulations 6 (2010), www.neustar.biz. 
 87 About PokerStars, POKERSTARS.NET, http://www.pokerstars.net/about/ (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2011). 
 88 Letter from Preet Bharara, U.S. Att‘y, S.D.N.Y., to David M. Zornow, et al., 
Partners, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (Apr. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.rakeback.com/images/doj-pokerstars-domain-name-reinstatement.pdf.  In this 
case, the U.S. government‘s leverage over the company has been the company‘s U.S.-
registered domain name. 
 89 See Oberverwaltungsgericht Nordrhein-Westfalen [OVG] [Higher Administrative 
Court] July 2, 2010, BECK-ONLINE DATENBANK [BECKRS] 50510 (Ger.) (the decision 
refers to other German cases in which the German courts agreed that geolocation may be 
used to comply with their territorially-limited decisions); Oberverwaltungsgericht 
Nordrhein-Westfalen [OVG] [Higher Administrative Court] July 13, 2010, BECK-ONLINE 
DATENBANK [BECKRS] 51049 (Ger.).  On the initial approaches by German courts to the 
use of geolocation see Michael Winkelmüller & Hans-Wolfram Kessler, 
Territorialisierung von Internet-Angeboten – Technische Möglichkeiten, völker-, 
wirtschaftsverwaltungs- und ordnungsrechtliche Aspekte, 5 GEWARCH 181, 181–83 
(2009). 
 90 But cf. Oberverwaltungsgericht Lüneburg [OVG] [Higher Administrative Court] 
Apr. 3, 2009, BECK-ONLINE DATENBANK [BECKRS] 33166 (Ger.) (an earlier opinion by a 
German court concerning geolocation).  ―[I]t is not without a question whether at this 
time enough technically matured possibilities exist to exclude the Internet access only 
from Lower Saxony.‖ Id. 
 91 See, e.g., H.R. 10-1193, 67th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Co. 2010) (enforcing 
online sales tax), enforcement temporarily stayed by an injunction. 
 92 See, e.g., Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
347, §5362 (10)(B)(ii)(I), 120 Stat. 1952, 1955; H.R. 2267, 111th Cong., §5381(5)(B), 
§5383(b) (2009). 
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Sufficiently reliable geolocation tools,
93
 if used appropriately 
and with due regard to protection of privacy,
94
 could indeed assist 
in effective regulation and enforcement on the Internet.
95
  Defined 
borders on the Internet would also benefit Internet actors who 
could deal with their rights on a country-by-country basis.  Such 
partitioning makes entries into markets less costly for smaller 
entities because they do not have to bear the expense of a 
worldwide license, and country-by-country rights give right-
holders the opportunity to maximize their profits by seeking the 
best licensing opportunities.
96
 
 
 93 On accuracy of the tools see infra section II.B. 
 94 For a project concerned with the protection of privacy (personal data protection) in 
geolocation see Barnes et al., supra note 8, at 5–6. 
 95 Clarification of online jurisdictional boundaries for purposes of determining 
personal jurisdiction over an actor on the Internet would also be beneficial. Although 
courts in the world are refining their approaches to asserting personal jurisdiction over 
actors acting on the Internet, the tests leave Internet users with no clear rules.  Some of 
the ―low-tech‖ factors used in personal jurisdiction analyses appear to be losing 
relevance; for instance, the fact that a website utilizes a particular top-level country 
domain (such as .de or .fr) might not say much about the website‘s intentions to target or 
avoid users in a particular country when users no longer type in website addresses but 
instead locate websites through search engines that link users directly to the sites.  With 
English becoming the universal language of the Internet it might be increasingly difficult 
to claim that a website in English is not directed at a jurisdiction in which English is not 
the primary or official language. See Joined Cases C-585/08 & C-144/09, Peter Pammer 
v. Reederei Karl Schluter GmbH & Co. KG and Hotel Aplenhof GesmbH v. Oliver 
Heller, ¶ 84 (2010), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri 
=CELEX:62008CJ0585:EN:HTML (noting that ―the language or the currency used . . . 
do not constitute relevant factors for the purpose of determining‖ personal jurisdiction).  
Similarly, the fact that a website is interactive, although originally viewed by courts as a 
determinative factor in the personal jurisdiction inquiry, is no longer considered 
determinative on its own by many courts. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 79 (noting that the distinction 
between ―interactive‖ and other websites ―is not decisive‖); see also Illinois v. Hemi Grp. 
LLC, 622 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2010).  The fact that a website employs geolocation 
tools might be a persuasive argument for the absence of personal jurisdiction over a 
website operator who uses the tools to prevent users from certain jurisdictions from 
accessing its website. See generally King, supra note 83 (discussing geolocation tools 
and personal jurisdiction). 
 96 It is possible that the right owner may determine that a worldwide license is the best 
option; however, partitioning may give the right owner a bargaining advantage.  For a 
contrary view in the context of the EU single market see Joined Cases C-403/08 & C-
429/08, Football Ass‘n Premier League Ltd. et al. v. QC Leisure et al. and Karen Murphy 
v. Media Prot. Svcs. Ltd. (2011), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex 
UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62008C0403:EN:HTML. 
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B. Operation of Geolocation Tools 
Geolocation in the broadest sense is any means of detecting an 
Internet user‘s location.  The raison d‘être of geolocation tools is 
the determination of the physical location of a user; the tools are 
not designed to identify or track a particular user.  Although they 
may use information that identifies a particular device that is used 
to access the Internet, such information is not necessarily sufficient 
to identify a particular user.
97
  Absent implantation of a device into 
a human body, it will remain a challenge to attribute acts on the 
Internet to a particular human actor if more than one person has 
access to a device.
98
  Despite this shortcoming, geolocation tools 
are being designed, used, and constantly improved because of the 
value that is attached to the ability to identify a user‘s location. 
The most basic geolocation tools are based on self-reporting.  
For instance, an Internet website that requires registration asks a 
user for his location.  Based on the information input by the user, 
the website tailors the content according to the regulations of the 
country where the user is located.
99
  Another self-reporting 
mechanism offers users a list of countries in a dropdown menu, 
and after the user selects a country, the website directs the user to 
 
 97 In cases of dynamically assigned IP addresses, the same IP address may lead to 
different devices at different times.  Statically assigned or embedded IP addresses can 
identify a particular device but cannot link the device to a particular user if several users 
have physical or virtual access to the device.   For more on statically and dynamically 
assigned IP addresses see infra notes 107–15 and accompanying text.  A device may also 
be identified by ―fingerprinting‖ methods that can recognize the same machine repeatedly 
by various indicators other than—or in combination with—an IP address. See, e.g., 
PANOPTICLICK, http://panopticlick.eff.org/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
 98 Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt was quoted as commenting on the need for 
attribution on the Internet: ―In a world of asynchronous threats, it is too dangerous for 
there not to be some way to identify you.  We need a [verified] name service for people. 
Governments will demand it.‖ Gareth Beavis, Schmidt: We Can Predict Where You Are 
Going to Go, TECHRADAR (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.techradar.com/news/internet/ 
schmidt-we-can-predict-where-you-are-going-to-go-708339. 
 99 This is what Seth Finkelstein called ―co-operative geo-location‖ as opposed to 
―oppositional geo-location.‖ ―[I]t is in the interests of the party being located to co-
operate with supplying geographic information, in order to gain some benefit.‖ Expert 
Report of Seth Finkelstein, Nitke v. Ashcroft, 253 F. Supp. 2d. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 
01 Civ. 11476). 
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its country-specific pages.
100
  Self-reporting is certainly sufficient 
for advertising purposes or for purposes of facilitating convenient 
content (such as pricing in local currency), but it is certainly not a 
tool for enforcement.  Even if the self-reporting is part of a user 
agreement or licensing agreement, the benefits of the agreement or 
the threat of contractual sanctions under the agreement may not be 
sufficient incentives for users to report accurate information.  
However, if the self-reported location data are reliable, and if they 
are collected and retained, they may be used to recognize the same 
user in the future
101
 or help identify the location of additional 
users.
102
  Naturally, any such activity raises serious privacy 
concerns.
103
 
 
 100 See, e.g., BRITISH AIRWAYS, http://www.britishairways.com/travel/country_choice 
/public/en_us (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
 101 ―A simple way to find out the geographic location of a user visiting a Web site is to 
ask them . . . Location data, once entered, can thereafter be associated with a client IP 
address.‖ James A. Muir & Paul C. Van Oorschot, Internet Geolocation: Evasion and 
Counterevasion, ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS, Dec. 2009, at 4:1, 4:8. 
 102  Three experts who work for Facebook have estimated the location of users based on 
their ―friends‖ in social media, thus exploring the probability of friendship as a function 
of distance. Lars Backstrom et. al., Find Me If You Can: Improving Geographical 
Prediction with Social and Spatial Proximity, WORLD WIDE WEB CONFERENCE, 61 (Apr. 
26–30, 2010), http://delivery.acm.org/10.1145/1780000/1772698/p61-backstrom.pdf?ip= 
150.108.239.43&acc=ACTIVE%20SERVICE&CFID=64593187&CFTOKEN=5529153
9&__acm__=1328312060_1287e167fe6e65e8e6f255474345c4ab (a paper presented at 
the 2010 World Wide Web Conference).  
 103 ―If IP addresses are considered ‗personal data‘ or ‗personal information‘ for privacy 
purposes, the collection, use and disclosure of such information may be seriously 
restricted.‖ Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Geo-Location Technologies and Other Means of 
Placing Borders on the ―Borderless‖ Internet, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 
101, 134 (2004) [hereinafter Svantesson, Placing Boarders]. See Bundesgericht [BGer] 
[Federal Supreme Court] Sept. 8, 2010, 136 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN 
BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] II 508 (Switz.) (discussing IP addresses as personal data); 
Jennifer Valentino-Devries & Emily Steel, ―Cookies‖ Cause Bitter Backlash, WALL ST. 
J. (Sept. 19, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487044169045755022 
6133569370.html (―Since July, at least six suits have been filed in U.S. District Court for 
the Central District of California against websites and companies that create advertising 
technology, accusing them of installing online-tracking tools that are so surreptitious that 
they essentially hack into users‘ machines without their knowledge.  All of the suits seek 
class-action status and accuse companies of violating the federal Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act and other laws against deceptive practices.‖). See Barnes et al., supra note 8, 
at 5–6. 
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Other methods of identifying the location of Internet users 
involve reliance on information that is presumably difficult for 
users to conceal or change.  For instance, any website that requires 
payment by credit card may use the purchaser‘s billing address as a 
reliable indicator of the user‘s location.  An online store may 
conclude that most delivery addresses will coincide with a 
purchaser‘s location.  An airline may assume that the country of 
departure on a plane ticket is an accurate proxy for the country 
where the traveler is located.  These indicators are clearly not 
perfect; travelers do not always purchase tickets to depart from 
their current location, purchasers do not always buy from the same 
location to which they wish goods to be delivered, and people do 
not always carry credit cards with billing addresses that correspond 
to their current location.  Although less susceptible to manipulation 
than self-reporting, these other methods also fail as sufficiently 
reliable enforcement tools. 
Geolocation tools provide a higher, though also not perfect, 
degree of reliability.  These tools rely on the IP addresses of 
devices with which users access the Internet and are known as ―IP 
geolocation‖ tools.104  IP addresses are often described as 
―analogous to . . . physical mailing address[es],‖105 because they 
allow for accurate transmittal and receipt of data.
106
  As for their 
utility in localizing users, their use is more complicated than the 
use of physical addresses because often IP addresses are not 
static—meaning permanently assigned to particular devices—but 
are assigned dynamically (and temporarily)
107
 to those devices.  By 
 
 104 ―Informally, Internet geolocation is the problem of determining the physical 
location (to some level of granularity) of an Internet user. A related but more specific 
term is IP geolocation, which refers to the problem of locating an Internet host using only 
its IP address.‖ Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 2; see also SVANTESSON, 
http://www.svantesson.org/projects/geo-identification/free-geo-location-tools.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2011) (providing examples of free geolocation tools). 
 105 Joshua J. McIntyre, Balancing Expectations of Online Privacy: Why Internet 
Protocol (IP) Addresses Should Be Protected As Personally Identifiable Information, 60 
DEPAUL L. REV. 895, 900 (2011). 
 106 See, e.g., McIntyre, supra note 105 (discussing IP addresses). 
 107 Although it is possible to assign static IP addresses dynamically, this paper uses the 
term ―dynamically assigned IP address‖ to refer to the practice of dynamically assigning 
an IP address for a temporary period of time. 
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analogy, imagine an apartment complex that has one street number 
and one hundred apartment numbers.  A static IP address would be 
similar to a complete address with the street number and apartment 
number, which would never change and always identify the same 
apartment.  Using a dynamically assigned IP address would be 
similar to using the address of the apartment complex main office, 
which assigns in rotation the reusable numbers 1 to 100 to the 
apartments as people rent various apartments in the building; in 
this case only the office would know at any given moment which 
apartment was identified as, say, apartment 57.  Similarly, only 
Internet service providers know at any given moment which 
dynamically assigned IP addresses are assigned to which users.
108
 
Dynamically assigned IP addresses have become a standard 
feature of Internet connections since IP addresses became scarce in 
recent years because of the exhaustion of all addresses that are 
available under the currently prevailing Internet protocol in use—
IPv4.
109
  Because of the insufficient supply of IP addresses under 
this protocol (and as of February 2011 all IPv4 addresses were 
officially assigned),
110
 Internet service providers have commonly 
held a pool of reusable IP addresses that they assign to various 
users temporarily and reassign to other users as users log on and 
off the Internet.  The successor to IPv4, IPv6,
111
 offers 340 
undecillion IP addresses
112
 and therefore allows for static addresses 
to be assigned to or embedded in all individual Internet-connected 
 
 108 Internet service providers know which IP address is assigned to which account; 
naturally, they cannot identify which particular user (person, family member, colleague) 
is actually accessing the Internet with the device using the IP address.  
 109 Experts have warned about the shortage of available IP addresses, and ―[a]s of 3 
February 2011, the central pool of available IPv4 addresses managed by the Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) has been depleted.‖ IPv4 Depletion and IPv6 
Deployment FAQs, NO. RESOURCE ORG., http://www.nro.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/ 
02/nro_depletion_deployment_faq.pdf (last visited Nov. 19. 2011). 
 110 See Available Pool of Unallocated IPv4 Internet Addresses Now Completely 
Emptied, ICANN (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.icann.org/en/news/releases/release-03feb11-
en.pdf. 
 111 See What is IPv6?, IPV6 ACT NOW, http://www.ipv6actnow.org/ (last visited  Nov. 
19, 2011). 
 112 See id.  340 undecillion is 3.4 x 1038. 
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devices,
113
 opening the way to new business models and 
technological innovations that may utilize advantages associated 
with certainty of identification and traceability of devices with 
permanent and identifiable IP addresses.
114
  For now though, many 
IP addresses continue to be dynamically assigned.
115
 
Once a device connects to the Internet it announces its IP 
address and thus allows others to geolocate it.
116
  The problem with 
geolocation is that there is no centralized register of all IP 
addresses that lists corresponding physical devices;
117
 lists exist 
 
 113 See McIntyre, supra note 105, at 901 (―Unlike current IP addresses, IPv6 addresses 
will include a unique code dictated by a computer‘s hardware, in effect making IPv6 
addresses globally unique and permanently assigned to particular devices.  IPv6 is 
unlikely to suffer from the address exhaustion that plagues the current protocol: the new 
system creates a 128-bit address, providing for approximately 340 undecillion . . . 
possible addresses.‖).  Naturally, this development worries those who are concerned 
about privacy on the Internet. See, e.g., Shawn C. Helms, Translating Privacy Values 
With Technology, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 288, 299 (2001) (―IPv6, a proposed TCP/IP 
protocol for Internet communication, could be the nail in the coffin of anonymity on the 
Internet.‖). 
 114 For instance, household appliances may be connected to the Internet and easily 
recognized if they have static IP addresses.  This raises important privacy issues. See 
generally Barnes et al., supra note 8. 
 115 The adoption of IPv6 did not keep up with the growing needs for IP addresses, and 
since IPv4 addresses could be assigned dynamically the adoption of IPv6 was not an 
imperative.  However, we will probably see an acceleration in the adoption of IPv6 now 
since IP addresses under IPv4 were finally exhausted in February 2011 and there is a 
dramatically growing number of devices that require connection to the Internet. See 
Dylan Tweney, No Easy Fixes as Internet Runs out of Addresses, WIRED (Feb. 3, 2001), 
http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/02/Internet-addresses/.  Users may purposefully 
change dynamically assigned IP address by powering off and on their routers. See Riva 
Richmond, Resisting the Online Tracking Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2010, at B7, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/technology/personaltech/11basics.html. 
 116 For an easy-to-understand explanation of the functioning of the traffic on the 
Internet, see Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, in THE EMERGENT GLOBAL 
INFORMATION POLICY REGIME 203, 204–07 (Sandra Braman ed., 2004). 
 117 This is what Dan Jerker B. Svantesson refers to as ―source problems.‖ See Dan 
Jerker B. Svantesson, The Impact of Geo-location Technologies on Internet Content 
Licensing – Let the ―Cat and Mouse‖ Game Begin, Intellectual Property Forum, No. 63, 
Dec. 2005, at 25 [hereinafter Svantesson, Cat and Mouse].  On ―circumvention 
problems‖ see infra note 130 and accompanying text; see also Edelman, supra note 9, at 
3–4; Thomas Hoeren, Zoning and Geolocation – Technische Ansätze zu einer 
Reterritorialisierung des Internet, 1 MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT 3 (2007) (―[T]he 
decentralized management of the Internet means that there is no authoritative database of 
host locations.‖) [hereinafter Hoeren, Zoning and Geolocation]; Ethan Katz-Bassett et al., 
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that provide some information but none are complete and updated 
in real time.  Although geolocation tool providers use lists and 
databases—both publicly accessible lists and lists obtained from 
other sources
118—these data sources are often not sufficient and 
the providers may complement the functioning of their tools by 
utilizing other geolocation techniques.  In their 2009 paper Internet 
Geolocation: Evasion and Counterevasion, apparently the first 
scientific paper to address the technical issues of both geolocation 
and geolocation evasion comprehensively,
119
 James A. Muir and 
Paul C. Van Oorschot provide an overview of other geolocation 
techniques.
120
  Among the techniques they list are estimates based 
on the time that it takes for the device in question to respond to a 
ping request (a request for response) from another device with a 
known geographical location,
121
 and estimates based on the routing 
of packets that carry information through the network.
122
  
Combinations of methods are reported to yield the best results.
123
 
 
Towards IP Geolocation Using Delay and Topology Measurements, IMC‘06, Oct. 25–27, 
2006, available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1177090. 
 118 See Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 4–8, 10; see also Bamba Gueye et al. 
Constraint-Based Geolocation of Internet Hosts, 14 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON 
NETWORKING 1219, 1220 (Dec. 2006); European Location Study, PTOLEMUS CONSULTING 
GRP., 92 (July 2010), http://www.quova.com/downloads/wp-freestudylaunch0707.pdf  
(reporting that Quova used a list of locations of 2.6 billion IP addresses). 
 119 There are earlier scientific papers on geolocation, but if they mention evasion at all, 
they do so only briefly.  For legal papers on geolocation that mention evasion see infra 
note 133. 
 120 See generally Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101. 
 121 See id. at 8 (―However, the time for IP packets to travel between two hosts at fixed 
locations varies.‖); see also Katz-Bassett et al., supra note 117, at 72 (―[O]ur study 
reveals that techniques based solely on network measurements have inherent 
limitations.‖); cf. Gueye et al., supra note 118, at 1219 (―[W]e propose Constraint-Based 
Geolocation (CBG), which infers the geographic location of Internet hosts using 
multilateration with distance constraints, thus establishing a continuous space of answers 
instead of a discrete one. . . . Our experimental results show that CBG outperforms the 
previous geolocation techniques.‖). 
 122 See Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 10. 
 123 On the effectiveness of combining several methods of geolocation see for example 
Backstrom et al., supra note 102, at 69 (―[T]he addition of social information to the task 
of predicting physical location produces measurable improvement in accuracy when 
compared to standard IP-based methods.‖). 
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The accuracy of geolocation tools is subject to debate;
124
 less 
debate has occurred on the question of what degree of accuracy 
should be expected if these tools are to be considered tools of 
compliance with regulatory and enforcement measures.
125
  Not 
surprisingly, entities that sell geolocation tools claim that their 
tools are highly effective;
126
 critics tend to question the providers‘ 
data and point out that even if geolocation tool providers publish 
data on the effectiveness of their tools, it is difficult to verify the 
data because most providers ―do not publish their results, nor 
detailed information about their methods.‖127  Muir and Van 
Oorschot have also noted that the data reported by providers about 
the high accuracy of the tools ―typically assume no evasive action 
by users.‖128 
 
 124 For a discussion of opposing views on the issue of effectiveness of geolocation tools 
by two German Courts—the Bayerischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof and Thüringer 
Oberverwaltungsgericht—see for example Hörnle & Zammit, supra note 80, at 38–39. 
See also Verwaltungsgericht München [VG] [Administrative Trial Courts] Nov. 20, 
2008, BECK-ONLINE DATENBANK [BECKRS] 40756 (Ger.); Verwaltungsgericht Karlsruhe 
[VG] [Administrative Trial Courts] Dec. 17, 2007, BECK-ONLINE DATENBANK [BECKRS] 
33500 (Ger.). 
 125 For an interesting discussion about the expected level of accuracy of geolocation for 
purposes of compliance with a court order, see Oberverwaltungsgericht Nordrhein-
Westfalen [OVG] [Higher Administrative Court] July 2, 2010, BECK-ONLINE 
DATENBANK [BECKRS] 50510 (Ger.) (―[T]he appellant is not required to exclude 
perfectly participation from Nordrhein-Westfalen in its Internet game of chance.  It is 
only ordered that measures [of geolocation as ordered by the court] be introduced by the 
deadline [set by the court] and thereby the access from Nordrhein-Westfalen is 
significantly limited.‖). See generally Trimble, Cross-Border Injunctions, supra note 85, 
at 349. 
 126 See Geolocation: Ensuring Compliance with Online Gaming Regulations, supra 
note 86, at 8 (―Using IP Intelligence data from Neustar, Ladbrokes was able to comply 
with [a Dutch Supreme Court] ruling by blocking online users from locations inside the 
Netherlands–a task that was achieved with virtually 100% accuracy.‖); see also European 
Location Study, supra note 118.  On the accuracy of geolocation tools, see also 
Svantesson, supra note 103, at 111 ff.  For older data on other services, see Thomas 
Hoeren, Geolokalisation und Glücksspielrecht (Teil 2), 5 ZEITSCHFRIFT FÜR WETT-UND 
GLÜCKSSPIELRECHT 311, 312–13 (2008) [hereinafter Hoeren, Geolokalisation]; 
Svantesson, The Accuracy of Geo-Location, supra note 28, at 13–15. 
 127 See Edelman, supra note 9, at 6; Svantesson, Placing Boarders, supra note 103, at 
112. 
 128 Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 21. On the question of the accuracy of 
geolocation tools see Svantesson, The Accuracy of Geo-Location, supra note 28, at 13–
20. 
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It is questionable whether we should require impermeable 
barriers from website operators who utilize geolocation to comply 
with regulation,
129
 and whether operators should be expected to 
detect geolocation evasion.  Evasion techniques will continue to be 
developed and it might be technologically impossible to preempt 
their development and use.  Perhaps this is where ―code‖ in the 
legal sense cannot be unequivocally shaped by ―code‖ in the 
technical sense; maybe this is one of the cases in which legal rules 
have to intervene and provide support for the technical solutions, 
which in this case are endangered by evasion techniques that 
enable cybertravel. 
III. EVASION OF GEOLOCATION 
The seminal problem of geolocation is that techniques exist 
that allow users to thwart geolocation tools.
130
  Ben Laurie, the 
expert who provided testimony on geolocation in the well-known 
Yahoo! case in France,
131
 pointed out that, in fact, ―it is 
fantastically easy to deliberately evade geolocation.‖132  
Notwithstanding the interest of governments and various actors on 
the Internet in geolocation as a means of achieving compliance 
with regulation and enforcement, and the fact that evasion may 
render geolocation largely ineffective, evasion techniques have 
been mentioned in the literature only marginally.
133
  Even in the 
 
 129 For ―A Brief History of Geolocation and the Law‖ see Kevin F. King, Geolocation 
and Federalism on the Internet: Cutting Internet Gambling‘s Gordian Knot, 11 COLUM. 
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 41, 59–63 (2010); see also Trimble, Cross-Border Injunctions, 
supra note 85, at 349. 
 130 See Svantesson, Cat and Mouse, supra note 117, at 25 (referring to these techniques 
as ―circumvention problems.‖); see also Hoeren, Zoning and Geolocation, supra note 
117. 
 131 For the response in the United States to the litigation in France, see Yahoo!, Inc. v. 
La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L‘Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).  Ben 
Laurie was also a founding director of the Apache Software Foundation. See Ben Laurie, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ben_Laurie (last visited Dec. 19, 2011).  
 132 See Declaration of Bennet Laurie in Lieu of Direct Testimony at 12, Nitke v. 
Ashcroft, 253 F. Supp. 2d 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 01 Civ. 11476) (emphasis added). 
 133 See, e.g., Svantesson, Cat and Mouse, supra note 117, at 24–30; Hoeren, Zoning and 
Geolocation, supra note 117; Thomas Hoeren, Das Pferd frisst keinen Gurkensalat – 
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scientific literature it was not until December 2009 that the first 
paper was published that focused fully on the techniques for 
evading geolocation.
134
  Although a number of legal papers have 
been authored on geolocation and its legal implications, only two 
short articles
135
 have addressed the legal issues associated with 
geolocation evasion tools or cybertravel.
136
  However, interest in 
cybertravel will increase as geolocation becomes omnipresent and 
evasion tools even more user-friendly than they are today. 
A spectrum of evasion techniques is available and a variety of 
providers offer means of evasion with various levels of 
sophistication.
137
  Of course, remote access to computers that 
would have resulted in evasion of geolocation existed long before 
some of the current ―mainstream‖ cybertravel tools emerged.  For 
example, the Telnet and SSH protocols both allow logins to remote 
computers, and today commercial services such as GoToMyPC
138
 
and LogMeIn
139
 make it easy for a user to remotely access a 
computer located anywhere in the world, thereby facilitating the 
 
Überlegung zur Internet Governance, 36 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHEN 2615 (2008); 
Hoeren, Geolokalisation, supra note 126; King, supra note 83, at 71. 
 134 Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 2 (―In contrast to our work, the academic 
literature to date on Internet geolocation techniques . . . has generally implicitly assumed 
that no evasive action is being taken.‖). Id. at 21 (―[W]e know of no open study of 
evasive geolocation prior to the present article, a preliminary version of which was 
captured in a technical report [in 2006].‖).  The technical report is available at 
http://www.scs.carleton.ca/research/tech_reports/2006/download/TR-06-05.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2011).  For an earlier paper discussing evasion techniques see Edelman, 
supra note 9. 
 135 See Svantesson, Cat and Mouse, supra note 117, at 24–30; Sven Mitsdörffer & Ulf 
Gutfleisch, ―Geo-Sperren‖ – wenn Videoportale ausländische Nutzer aussperren: Eine 
urheberrechtliche Betrachtung, 11 MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT 731 (2009). 
 136 Other than in the articles noted supra in footnote 135, the possibility of evasion is 
mentioned only as a side note in the literature. See, e.g., Johnson & Post, supra note 49, 
at 1374 (brief mention of the possibility to ―simply reconfigure [the user‘s] connection so 
as to appear to reside in a location outside the particular territory.‖). 
 137 This Part leaves aside instances of ―accidental cybertravel‖—instances in which an 
Internet user‘s IP address is altered without the user‘s knowledge or intent. See 
Backstrom, et al., supra note 102, at 61; Expert Report of Ben Laurie at 17, Nitke v. 
Ashcroft, 253 F. Supp. 2d 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 01 Civ. 11476).  
 138 See GOTOMYPC, http://www.gotomypc.com/remote_access/remote_access (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
 139 See LOGMEIN, https://secure.logmein.com/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
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use of the remote computer‘s Internet connection and foreign IP 
address.  This type of cybertravel can be described as ―self-
sustained‖ because it is facilitated by equipment that a user may 
own or have available through family or friends in another 
country.
140
  As opposed to these ―self-sustained‖ cybertravel 
methods, the ―mainstream‖ cybertravel tools that are described 
below do not rely on a user‘s own equipment or equipment to 
which a user specifically secures access in advance. 
Most Internet users who remember the beginnings of the 
Internet are familiar with the most basic geolocation evasion 
technique, although they do not usually think of it as a tool for 
evading geolocation.  It is the use of a dial-up connection to an 
Internet service provider phone number in a foreign country.
141
  
Once connected to the foreign dial-up service provider, the user is 
assigned an IP address for that country by the foreign provider, and 
it appears as if the user is located in the foreign country.  The 
problems with this technique are the cost and speed of the 
connection.  The speed problem is familiar to anyone who has ever 
used a dial-up connection, and calling a telephone number in a 
foreign country for an extended period of time can still be 
expensive.  Although subject to these disadvantages, this form of 
cybertravel could be the only cybertravel available if a government 
shuts down the Internet throughout the country by ordering all 
Internet service providers to stop providing access to the network, 
as the government of Egypt did in January 2011.
142
 
 
 140 The use of a user‘s own equipment makes the ―self-sustained‖ cybertravel similar to 
the Slingbox concept. See infra note 259. 
 141 See Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 13. 
 142 See Evgeny Mozorov, Egypt Action May Spread Internet Kill Switch Idea, SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Feb. 6, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f 
=%2Fc%2Fa%2F2011%2F02%2F05%2FINO91HHD7P.DTL.  Although it was the 
situation in Egypt in January 2011 that raised general attention to the problem of 
governmental interference with access to the Internet, there were other instances of 
smaller countries (Nepal and Burma) engaging in the same tactics (in 2005 and 2007, 
respectively). See Christopher Beam, Egypt Protest Internet Shut Off: How Did the 
Egyptian Government Turn Off the Internet?, SLATE (Jan. 28, 2011), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2283000/.  For a detailed account of the Internet disconnection 
in Egypt, see James Crowie, Egypt Leaves the Internet, RENESYS BLOG (Jan. 27, 2011), 
http://www.renesys.com/blog/2011/01/egypt-leaves-the-internet.shtml.  
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Another cybertravel technique involves the use of a proxy IP 
address: users connect to the Internet through special software or a 
website that reroutes their connection, shields their IP address, and 
uses its own, creating the appearance in cyberspace that the user is 
connected through another device in another location.  The easiest 
of these proxy tools to use, but the least likely to function well 
enough to satisfy most purposes for which cybertravel is desired, is 
a website in which users insert the Internet addresses of pages 
blocked by geolocation tools.  The website then opens the 
requested pages on the users‘ behalf.143  The major problem with 
this system for users is that the requested websites easily recognize 
a proxy and can simply block all access by the proxy.
144
 
Another type of proxy service is the easy–to–use subscription 
services that allow users, for a fee, to sign in on a website and be 
reconnected through a proxy.  There are variations of these 
services based on the audience that they target; some services 
focus primarily on customers interested in anonymization—
Internet users who are concerned about their privacy.
145
  These 
services, such as Anonymizer,
146
 promise anonymity on the Internet 
by rerouting users to a neutral IP address—an IP address that is 
located somewhere that ―do[es] not create suspicion.‖147  Some 
users wish to obtain an IP address from a particular country;
148
 for 
instance, in addition to anonymization, Anonymizer also offers a 
 
 143 See, e.g., ANONYMOUSE, http://anonymouse.org/anonwww.html (last visited Nov. 
19, 2011); MADMANWEB, http://www.madmanweb.com/anon.html (last visited Nov. 19, 
2011). 
 144 Svantesson has noted additional problems: because the websites are so easy to use 
they are quickly overloaded by users; additionally, they offer ―only a limited number of 
countries one can appear to be located in.‖ Svantesson, The Accuracy of Geo-Location, 
supra note 28, at 17–18. 
 145 For more on anonymization and its relationship to cybertravel, see Part IV.B.2. 
 146 See ANONYMIZER, http://www.anonymizer.com/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
 147 See How It Works, ANONYMIZER, http://www.anonymizer.com/business/how_it_ 
works.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
 148 For instance, the following website offers advice on how to connect via a German IP 
address.  Although the advice is of general application, the website targets users who 
wish to appear as if they are connected to the Internet from Germany. See Change Your 
IP Address to Germany, IPRIVACYTOOLS, http://www.iprivacytools.com/ip-address-
germany/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
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Geographic Distribution technology, which allows users to select 
the geographical location of their proxy IP address.
149
 
There are also services that specialize in cybertravel to certain 
countries.  For instance, My Expat Network
150
 provides 
connections to users who want to watch U.K. television programs 
but are located outside the United Kingdom and cannot access the 
programs because of geolocation.  For £5 per month they can sign 
in to My Expat Network and watch all the television shows that are 
on U.K. websites as if they were connected from inside the United 
Kingdom.
151
  The same provider offers the same service, for $6.50 
per month, to users outside the United States who want to watch 
U.S. television programs but are unable to do so because they are 
connected to the Internet with an outside-of-the-U.S. IP address 
and face similar access restrictions.
152
  Once they appear to be 
connected from inside the United States, these users may access 
not only television programs but any other content that may be 
viewed only from within the United States. 
One free proxy service that is more sophisticated than the 
services described above utilizes a series of proxies, for instance 
―private proxies‖—volunteers who provide access to their 
machines to people from other countries, such as political activists 
who fear detection and persecution in their own countries.
153
  The 
Tor project,
154
 which enjoys significant funding from the U.S. 
government,
155
 uses a chain of proxies to protect its users,
156
 who 
 
 149 See Success Stories, ANONYMIZER, http://www.anonymizer.com/business/success_ 
stories.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
 150 See MY EXPAT NETWORK, http://www.my-expat-network.co.uk/ (last visited Nov. 
19, 2011). 
 151 See id. 
 152 See id. 
 153 See Tor: Overview, TOR, http://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en#the 
solution (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
 154 See TOR, http://www.torproject.org/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
 155 About seventy-five percent of Tor funding comes from the U.S. government. 
Interview with Andrew Lewman, Executive Director, Tor, WBUR.ORG, Jan. 31, 2011, 
available at http://hereandnow.wbur.org/2011/01/31/egypt-Internet-government. 
 156 See Karsten Loesing, et al., A Case Study on Measuring Statistical Data in the Tor 
Anonymity Network, in FC 2010 WORKSHOPS 203, 203–05 (R. Sion et al. eds., 2010); 
Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 15; Tor: Overview, supra note 153.  
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are not only dissidents criticizing oppressive governments or 
persons avoiding government censorship,
157
 but also journalists 
communicating with whistleblowers, and the U.S. Navy gathering 
intelligence.
158
 
As are any evasive technical solutions, tools for the evasion of 
geolocation are also susceptible to detection, at least to some 
degree.
159
  For instance, a Java applet in a webpage may lead to the 
identification of a user‘s true IP address,160 and certain timing-
based geolocation tools might be able to localize a user without the 
tools ever detecting the user‘s true IP address.161  Providers of 
geolocation tools are constantly searching for ways to eliminate 
evasion and identify true IP addresses to determine the accurate 
geographic locations of Internet users.  As one might expect, this is 
a constant race where it may take just a few weeks or months for 
the creators of evasion techniques to respond to improvements in 
geolocation tools and improve their techniques to further challenge 
geolocation.
162
 
It is important to note that while cybertravel tools offered by 
various sources currently operate on the basis of IP addresses, 
 
 157 See Loesing et al., supra note 156, at 203. ―While the original goal of Tor was to 
enhance privacy, recently Tor has become popular amongst users who wish to 
circumvent national censorship systems, such as those in countries like Iran and China.‖ 
Id. at 204.  ―[T]he statistics . . . indicate that Tor usage significantly increased from 
Iranian IP space in June 2009 after the Iranian elections.‖ Id. at 206; see also Interview 
with Andrew Lewman, supra note 155. 
 158 See Tor: Overview, supra note 153.  For other ways to evade geolocation see 
Edelman, supra note 9; Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 14. 
 159 ―Another problem is that Internet anonymizers (intermediate web servers that 
disguise the user‘s IP address) and remote Internet connections can, despite 
countermeasures by geo-ID firms, still sometimes defeat the identification process.‖ 
GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 26, at 62. 
 160 See Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 16; see also Hoeren, Geolokalisation, 
supra note 126. 
 161 See Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 18.  Tools also exist to ―fingerprint‖ a 
device; however, unless one of the identifying features contains location information, the 
fingerprinting does not localize the device. 
 162 Compare Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 3, with information by the 
founders of the Tor project at the Def Con 18 conference in 2010 in Las Vegas, Nevada. 
See also Geographic Location/Privacy/geopriv, IETF, http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/geo 
priv/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
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cybertravel will not disappear simply because methods of locating 
Internet users other than methods based on IP addresses will be 
employed.  Indeed, in the future other methods of tracking Internet 
users‘ geographical locations could replace the current geolocation 
tools that use IP addresses; either newly emerging or already 
existing means—for instance means based on the global 
positioning system (―GPS‖)—could become the norm for 
localizing Internet users.
163
  Switching to any other means will not 
necessarily end cybertravel but will likely lead to the development 
of new evasion tools that will permit cybertravel under new 
conditions.
164
 
IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF CYBERTRAVEL 
It seems inevitable that the more geolocation is used to limit 
access to certain content on the Internet, the more users will 
cybertravel to bypass geolocation and access restricted content.  
Even in the absence of governmentally mandated use of 
geolocation by website operators, geolocation is likely to become 
widespread as website operators respond to the requirements of 
territorially-defined regulation on the Internet with a greater use of 
geolocation tools.  The more emphasis that regulators place on 
territorial regulation, and the more that geolocation tools become 
the means of complying with that regulation, the more pressing it 
will become for there to be a legal conceptualization of 
cybertravel.  This conceptualization will also be needed if in the 
future the need for attribution of acts on the Internet to particular 
devices leads to IP addresses or other location identifiers being 
embedded in Internet-connected devices; particularly in such an 
 
 163 See Eric Goldman, Geolocation and A Bordered Cyberspace, TECH. & MKTG. L. 
BLOG (Nov. 13, 2007), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2007/11/geolocation _and. 
htm.  On various methods of localizing devices see, for instance, Barnes et al., supra note 
8, at 15–16. 
 164 Even if IP addresses are embedded in devices—and even if they are permanently 
attached to particular persons (for instance, through implantation into the human body)—
cybertravel will not necessarily be excluded, because tools are likely to continue to be 
developed that will allow users to bypass geolocation. 
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environment the desire for cybertravel will intensify.
165
  It is 
therefore crucial and timely to determine whether cybertravel is a 
legal activity under present legal regimes and whether there are 
reasons for which cybertravel should be made or remain legal in 
the future.  This Part discusses the current legal status of 
cybertravel and suggests how the law should treat cybertravel in 
the future—if there is or should be a future for legal cybertravel.  It 
also reviews some technological and business solutions that may 
complement the future legal framework for cybertravel. 
A. Is Cybertravel Legal? 
It is difficult to analyze all the legal aspects of cybertravel in 
the abstract because cybertravel is used for a wide variety of 
purposes, both legal and illegal, such as avoiding governmental 
regulation, bypassing limitations imposed because of the 
contractual obligations of website operators, or merely viewing 
advertisements created for a location other than the one in which 
the user sits.
166
  However, it seems safe to state that there is one 
party involved in cybertravel that is unlikely to be exposed to 
liability: the website operator, who employs geolocation tools to 
make his website viewable only to users from certain countries, 
states, regions or locations.
167
  In fact, if a website operator‘s 
decision to limit access to his website is based on a law-related 
purpose (rather than a business-related purpose), he will usually 
employ geolocation tools to restrict access to his website from 
certain countries precisely for the purpose of complying with his 
legal obligations rather than avoiding them.
168
 
There are two parties that might be concerned about potential 
liability for their involvement in cybertravel and two acts in 
cybertravel that might lead directly or indirectly to liability.
169
  The 
 
 165 The same can be said for future devices that might be implanted into the human 
body, thereby allowing for identification of not only the device but also the particular 
person. 
 166 See supra note 14 and accompanying text (commenting on the scope of this article). 
 167 See supra Part II discussing geolocation tools. 
 168 The Hong Kong Company mentioned in Part II.A would be one exception.  
 169 Such liability may be both civil and criminal. See infra Part IV.A. 
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parties are the Internet user, who utilizes cybertravel tools to 
access restricted content, and the cybertravel tool provider, who 
facilitates cybertravel by offering and providing the cybertravel 
tools.
170
  The two acts involved in cybertravel that may expose the 
user and the provider to liability are the act of viewing or using 
restricted content and the act of cybertravel itself as a method of 
circumventing tools used to restrict access to content.  Although 
cybertravel providers might not view or use restricted content or 
cybertravel themselves, their facilitation of acts by users might 
subject the providers to liability. 
This section discusses the various legal aspects of cybertravel.  
It reviews the potential for liability for both the cybertraveling user 
and the cybertravel provider while taking into account current law 
in both the United States and other countries, with particular 
emphasis on copyright law.   
1. Liability of Cybertraveling Users 
The initial problem in assessing potential cybertraveler liability 
is the problem of localization of their acts.  Localization may 
determine not only the countries under whose laws a cybertraveler 
may be liable, but also often which countries‘ courts have personal 
jurisdiction over the cybertraveler.  Regardless of whether a 
cybertraveler‘s other acts establish general jurisdiction in a 
country, cybertravel can generate specific jurisdiction over the user 
that emanates from the acts of cybertravel itself. 
There are two approaches to the localization of the acts of 
cybertravel: the physical world approach and the cyberspace 
approach.  The physical world approach is straightforward: 
anything that the user does is localized in the place of his physical 
location.  Under this approach, when a user sits at his Internet-
connected device in Chile and cybertravels to Germany by 
utilizing a German IP address, his acts are localized in Chile where 
he is physically located.  If cybertravel enables the user to copy, 
without the copyright holder‘s authorization, content that is 
protected by copyright in Chile, the cybertraveler will be liable for 
 
 170 See supra Part III discussing cybertravel tools. 
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copyright infringement in Chile—even if the content is made 
available on the website of a non-Chilean website operator and is 
stored on a server located outside of Chile.  If Chile permits its 
courts to exercise personal jurisdiction based on tortious activity 
committed in their jurisdiction, Chilean courts will have personal 
jurisdiction over the user based on the user‘s acts in Chile. 
The user in the example could also be liable for his actions in 
Germany if Germany had adopted the cyberspace approach to 
localization.  The cyberspace approach follows the packets that 
carry information on the Internet and localizes acts based on the 
place or places in which the cybertraveler‘s physical acts (of typing 
on a keyboard) cause technological effects.  For example, imagine 
that the user in Chile cybertravels to Germany to access 
copyrighted content on a website run by a German website 
operator that is protected by technological protection measures 
against viewing by users connected from outside Germany.  If 
using cybertravel to bypass the measures and access the content 
without the copyright holder‘s authorization is illegal under 
German law,
171
 liability for the act would arise in Germany 
because Germany is the place where the measures are breached 
(causing technological effects) to access the servers that store the 
content.  Because Germany provides for the jurisdiction of German 
courts in the place of the effects of a tortious act, German courts 
have personal jurisdiction over the user in Chile based on the 
effects of the user‘s acts in Germany.172 
Of course difficulties arise if, using the example above, the 
content on the website that permits access only to users connecting 
from Germany is stored on servers that are located in another 
country, such as the United States.  In this scenario, the acts of 
 
 171 See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of the European approach to liability for 
breaching technological protection measures. 
 172 Council Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, art. 5(3), 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1; Case C-21/76, 
Handelskwekerij G. J.Bier B.V. v. Mines de Potasse d‘Alsace S.A., 1976 E.C.R. 1735; 
Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] Code of Civil Procedure, Sept. 12, 1950, Bundesgesetzblatt, 
Teil I (BGBl. I) 3202, as amended, § 32 (Ger.); ANDREAS RUFF, VERTRIEBSRECHT IM 
INTERNET 62 (2003). 
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breaching the protection measures and accessing the content 
without authorization would then technically occur in the United 
States.  While liability might arise under U.S. law, establishing 
personal jurisdiction in the United States based on the acts may be 
difficult unless information about the location of the servers was 
available to the cybertraveler at the time of his acts and it can be 
claimed that he purposefully directed his actions at the particular 
forum where the servers were located.  This is a general problem 
of personal jurisdiction on the Internet when purposeful direction 
of tortious acts is required and a user directs the acts at a specific 
forum, but the forum is unknown to him at the time of his acts.
173
 
Even when users‘ acts occur while the users are cybertraveling 
to another country, the users may still be in breach of laws that 
prohibit them from viewing certain content or engaging in certain 
conduct in the country where they are physically located.
174
  For 
instance, the online gambling laws of South Africa penalize not 
only companies that provide illegal online gambling in the 
jurisdiction of South Africa and Internet service providers who 
allow users in South Africa to access illegal online gambling 
websites, but the laws also hold liable users who gamble on such 
websites.
175
  Therefore, if a user located in South Africa gambles 
 
 173 For a discussion of the problem of acts on the Internet that are clearly directed at 
some forum but the identity of the forum is unknown to the user at the time of the act see 
Marketa Trimble, Setting Foot on Enemy Ground: Cease-and-Desist Letters, DMCA 
Notifications and Personal Jurisdiction in Declaratory Judgment Actions, 50 IDEA 777, 
818–21 (2010) [hereinafter Trimble, Enemy Ground]. 
 174 This article provides a few examples of such laws but does not cover all the legal 
doctrines that may be invoked when a user cybertravels. 
 175 In South Africa all three actors—the gambling website operator, the Internet service 
provider, and the end user—are liable for illegal online gambling. See On-line Gambling 
Transactions Are Outlawed in South Africa, GAUTENG GAMBLING BD., 
http://www.ggb.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3:newsflash-
2&catid=3:newsflash (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).  Compare this with the situation in the 
United States, where the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 does not 
apply to players who place bets. Gerd Alexander, The U.S. on Tilt: Why the Unlawful 
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act Is A Bad Bet, 2008 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 6, 29 
(2008); see also Federal Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2006); S. Rep. No. 588, 87th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) (and its associated legislative history). Cf. also Strafgesetzbuch 
[StGB] [Penal Code], May 15, 1871, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBl] 127, as amended, § 284–
85 (on unlawful operating of gambling and participating in unlawful gambling). 
  
610 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:567 
on one of these websites, the user breaches South African law, and 
the fact that the user cybertravels to another country to do the 
gambling will probably not shield the user from liability under 
South African law nor from the personal jurisdiction of the South 
African courts. 
What if the laws of the country of the user‘s physical location 
permit the user‘s acts but the acts are contrary to the laws of the 
country to which the user cybertravels?  Will a user‘s cybertravel 
to a country where access to particular content or certain activities 
are prohibited lead to the user‘s liability in that country?  While it 
may seem implausible that a user would purposefully cybertravel 
to a country to engage in an activity that is illegal under the laws of 
that country, such scenarios are possible.  For example, a user 
might want to criticize the country‘s political leaders to an extent 
that would be deemed illegal in that country and wish to appear as 
though he were located in the country.  In a particularly alarming 
scenario, a user may cybertravel to a country inadvertently—by 
being redirected randomly through an intermediate IP address in 
that country or by being assigned a final IP address in that country 
without the user‘s intent or knowledge.176  While the physical 
approach to cybertravel would create no user liability in a country 
to which the user had cybertraveled, the cyberspace approach 
would result in user liability.  However, the level of the interest of 
a country to which the user had cybertraveled in extending its 
prescriptive jurisdiction over a non-resident user or enforcing its 
laws against a non-resident user will vary according to the 
country‘s interest in regulating behavior by non-residents.  For 
example, a country might have a minimal interest in enforcing its 
anti-online gambling laws against non-resident users, even if the 
country‘s courts could find grounds for extending their personal 
jurisdiction over non-resident users.  A country might, however, 
have a much greater interest in extending its prescriptive and 
adjudicatory jurisdiction in a situation involving a restriction of 
speech
177
 or attacks on computers located in the country.
178
 
 
 176 See supra note 137 (discussing ―accidental cybertravel‖). 
 177 See infra notes 315 and 316. 
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a) Liability under Copyright Laws 
Copyright law is a particularly pertinent area for review in the 
context of cybertravel because geolocation tools are often used as a 
means of compliance with copyright laws, which afford 
territorially-limited rights, and which, despite their significant level 
of international harmonization, still vary among countries.
179
  
Although a website operator, for example, may secure a license for 
particular content, the license may be restricted to one country or a 
limited number of countries.  Website operators (or any licensee) 
may enter into licenses that are not worldwide for any number of 
reasons.  First, the licensee might not have the necessary resources 
to pay for worldwide rights, and obtaining a license for a limited 
market could be the licensee‘s only option.  Or, the licensor may 
decide not to license content in certain markets if the licensor plans 
to launch a country-specific version of the same content and does 
not want competition from foreign versions.
180
  Further, the 
licensor may wish to implement a strategy for releasing the work 
in different countries in various media at various times.  It is also 
possible that copyright in a particular work might not be held by 
the same right-holder in all countries and as a result there might be 
high transaction costs associated with locating all of the right-
holders and negotiating licenses with all of them, and right-holders 
in some countries might simply not agree to a license.  Because of 
the territorial limitations of licenses, website operators and other 
licensees use geolocation tools to limit access to licensed content 
 
 178 See infra Part IV.A.1.b (discussing the applicability of anti-hacking laws to acts of 
cybertravel). 
 179 Notwithstanding the great degree of international harmonization that has been 
achieved through several international treaties on copyright, copyright law is still a matter 
of national legislation and subject to national differences associated with certain 
flexibilities that are embedded in the treaties, occasional non-compliance with the 
treaties, and the fact that some issues of copyright law remain unaffected by international 
treaties. 
 180 There are numerous examples of national versions of television shows that are made 
inaccessible to users from other countries where local national versions are available. 
Dancing with the Stars is an example. See Outside the U.K.?, BBC: STRICTLY COME 
DANCING, http://www.bbc.co.uk/strictlycomedancing/about/#outside_the_uk (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2012). 
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to users located only in the countries for which they have secured a 
license.
181
 
A cybertraveler might be subject to liability if cybertravel is 
interpreted as an act of circumvention of geolocation, and if 
geolocation tools are considered tools that prevent access to or 
certain uses of a copyrighted work.  Protection against the 
circumvention of tools that protect works from unauthorized acts 
was introduced at the international level by the 1996 WIPO 
Copyright Treaty
182
 and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty
183
 (the ―WIPO Treaties‖), which in Articles 11 and 18 
respectively require countries that are parties to the Treaties to 
provide adequate legal protection and effective legal 
remedies against the circumvention of effective 
technological measures that are used by [right-
holders] in connection with the exercise of their 
rights . . . and that restrict acts . . . which are not 
authorized by the [right-holders] concerned or 
permitted by law.
184
 
Provided that geolocation tools meet the required standard of 
effectiveness,
185
 and cybertravel is viewed as a circumvention tool, 
 
 181 It is important to note that without a partitioning of the Internet some licensees 
would not be in business if a worldwide license was required for content that they wanted 
to use on the Internet. 
 182 World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 
S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997).  The Treaty was signed by the United 
States in 1997, ratified by the United States in 1999, and entered into force for the United 
States in 2002. Treaties and Contracting Parties, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ 
en/Remarks.jsp?cnty_id=1085C (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). The Treaty was implemented 
by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which was adopted in 1998. Digital Millenium 
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 28–60 (1998). 
 183 World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty art. 18, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997). 
 184 World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20, 
1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997); World Intellectual Property 
Organization [WIPO] Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 18, Dec. 20, 1996, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997).  For examples of technological protection 
measures see Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and 
Europe, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 323, 325–31 (2004). 
 185 It is unlikely that the fact that it is ―fantastically easy‖ to evade geolocation tools, 
Laurie supra note 132, at 12, would impact their ―effectiveness‖ for purposes of the anti-
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the question becomes, at least under the language of the WIPO 
Treaties, whether the use of geolocation tools—the filtering of 
access based on a user‘s location—is used to restrict unauthorized 
or illegal acts.
186
 
In line with the language of the WIPO Treaties, European laws 
that have implemented the WIPO Treaties and the corresponding 
 
circumvention provisions.  In the United States, technological protection measures have 
to be measures that, ―in the ordinary course of [their] operation, require the application of 
information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to 
gain access to work.‖ 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B) (2006).  In 321 Studios v. Metro 
Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004), the court rejected 
the argument that a technological measure cannot be considered effective if its 
countermeasures are ―widely available on the Internet.‖ Id. at 1095.  The court noted that 
the argument would be ―equivalent to a claim that, since it is easy to find skeleton keys 
on the black market, a deadbolt is not an effective lock to a door.‖ Id.  See also Universal 
City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that 
the effectiveness of a technological measure does not depend on ―whether or not it is a 
strong means of protection.‖). 
 In the United Kingdom Lord Justice Jacob commented on the term ―effective 
technological measures‖ in a 2008 decision: ―It is an odd phrase to use in English—in its 
context it clearly refers to something which is intended to have an effect rather than 
something which is invariably successful.  If it meant the latter, then there would be no 
need to have a law preventing circumvention.‖ Neil Stanley Higgs v. The Queen, [2008] 
EWCA (Crim) 1324, [27] (Eng.).  In the United Kingdom a measure is considered 
―effective‖ if it ―achieves the intended protection‖ by providing the copyright owner 
control of the use of the work ―through . . . an access control or protection process . . . 
[or] a copy control mechanism.‖ Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 
296ZF(2). 
 In Germany, geolocation tools that allow the restriction of access to users from 
certain countries would probably qualify under the definition of an effective technological 
measure as ―an access control.‖ Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte 
[UrhG] [German Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I] 3044, 
as amended, § 95a(2) (Ger.).  
 As the Oberlandesgericht München pointed out, the ineffectiveness of a 
technological protection measure cannot be concluded from the existence of a 
circumvention tool; ―it is more determinative for the effectiveness of the protection 
measures whether they prevent an average user from infringing copyright.‖ 
Oberlandesgericht München I [OLG I] [Higher Regional Court] Nov. 14, 2007, BECK-
ONLINE DATENBANK [BECKRS] 23466 (Ger.).  For a commentary on the issue of 
effectiveness from the EU perspective see Stefan Bechtold, A Commentary on the 2001 
EU Information Society Directive, in CONCISE EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW 343, 387–88 
(Thomas Dreier, P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006). 
 186 For a discussion of the problem from the Australian perspective see Svantesson, Cat 
and Mouse, supra note 117, at 27–28. 
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provision of the 2001 EU Information Society Directive
187
 require 
that circumvention of technological measures be associated with a 
committed or potential unauthorized or illegal act.
188
  For instance, 
a U.K. law provides protection for technological measures only to 
the extent that the measures aim at ―prevent[ing] or 
restrict[ing] . . . acts that are not authorised by the copyright owner 
. . . and are restricted by copyright.‖189  Since authorization is 
necessary only for acts that would infringe copyright if committed 
without authorization,
190
 measures preventing a user from 
accessing a work for reasons other than to prevent acts of 
copyright infringement will not enjoy the protection that the law 
 
 187 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 
2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society, art. 6, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 [hereinafter 2001 EU Information 
Society Directive].  
 188 Martin Senftleben, a commentary on the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, in CONCISE 
EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW 87, 111–12 (Thomas Dreier & Brent Hugenholtz eds., 2006). 
The requirement of a connection with the exercise of [the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty] or Berne rights reflects the principle expressed at 
the 1996 Diplomatic Conference that the protection of technological 
measures should complement the grant of exclusive rights so as to 
allow their effective enforcement in the digital environment. 
Accordingly, the international obligation to protect the right holder 
against acts of circumvention does not arise if the use of 
technological measures goes beyond the scope of the rights granted in 
the [WIPO Copyright Treaty] or the [Berne Convention]. 
Id. 
 It is debatable whether the same requirement of a link between the protection of 
technological measures and the protection of the rights granted by copyright applies in 
the EU to the protection of computer programs against ―any act of putting into 
circulation, or the possession for commercial purposes of, any means the sole intended 
purpose of which is to facilitate . . . circumvention of any technical device which may 
have been applied to protect a computer program.‖ Directive 2009/24/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of 
computer programs, art. 7(1)(c), 2009 O.J. (L 111) 16. 
 189 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 296ZF(3).  The provision that 
applies to a person circumventing a technological measure ―applied to a copyright work 
other than a computer program‖ is § 296ZA. 
 190 ―When speaking of ‗acts which are not authorised‘ it is implicit that one is 
considering only acts which need authorisation, i.e. acts which are otherwise restricted. 
To ‗authorise‘ a man to do something he is free to do anyway–something which needs no 
authority–is a meaningless concept.‖ Lord Justice Jacob in Neil Stanley Higgs v. The 
Queen, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1324, [32] (Eng.). 
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provides for technological protection measures.
191
  Similarly, the 
German Copyright Act limits the protection provided to 
technological measures by defining them as measures that are 
―designed to prevent or restrict‖ unauthorized acts.192  Therefore, 
the question of liability for circumvention of geolocation under the 
copyright laws of these countries depends on whether the 
cybertraveling user engages or may engage in an act of copyright 
infringement.
193
 
Based on the territoriality principle that governs copyright 
laws, it would appear logical for acts of circumvention to be illegal 
under the laws that protect copyrighted works only if the acts are 
connected to the infringement of copyright under the law of the 
same country.
194
  For example, if the associated act of direct 
 
 191 However, for a discussion on copyright infringements that occur in the United 
Kingdom when temporary copies are created, see infra notes 220–21 and accompanying 
text. 
 192 Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [UrhG] [German Copyright 
Act], Sept. 9, 1965, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I] 3044, as amended, § 108b(1) 
(Ger.); Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 
2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society, art. 6(3), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 17, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:167:0010:0019:EN:PDF. 
 193 In a 2010 decision the German Supreme Court confirmed that technological 
measures are also protected by German law when they are designed to protect the right to 
make a work available to the public under §19a of the German Copyright Act.  The right 
would probably not be interpreted to include the right of access by an individual user. See 
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 29, 2010, MEDIEN, INTERNET 
UND RECHT [MIR] 159, 2010 (Ger.).  For safeguards against technological measures that 
prevent uses allowed by copyright law see infra note 205.  See also Australian Copyright 
Act 1968 (Cth) § 10(1), available at http://www.adelaide.edu.au/legals/docs/copyright 
1968.pdf (―[C]ircumvention service means a service, the performance of which has only a 
limited commercially significant purpose, or no such purpose or use, other than the 
circumvention, or facilitating the circumvention, of an [sic] technological protection 
measure.‖); Svantesson, Cat and Mouse, supra note 117, at 26–27 (discussing the 
technological protection measure provision of the Act). 
 194 Theoretically, country A could impose liability under its copyright law even for a 
circumvention in country A of technological measures that was connected to an act of 
copyright infringement in country B.  Courts in country A would then have to assess 
whether copyright was infringed under B‘s law.  Courts in country A would determine 
liability for the acts of circumvention as long as A‘s courts considered copyright 
infringement actions to be transitory causes of action (meaning that infringements under 
B‘s copyright law would be justiciable in A‘s courts) or were willing to assess 
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copyright infringement is reproduction of the copyrighted work, 
the act of circumvention, if it can be tied to the direct infringement, 
can be infringing only where the act of reproduction occurred.  
Therefore, if a cybertraveler travels from Chile to Germany, and 
the only copyright infringing act that he commits is reproducing 
the accessed works on his computer in Chile (if the act is 
considered copyright infringing under Chilean law), it will be the 
Chilean anti-circumvention law that will apply; the German anti-
circumvention provision will not apply if there is no associated act 
of copyright infringement that could be localized in Germany.
195
 
The territorial limitations will not apply if a country‘s anti-
circumvention provisions do not protect copyrighted works from 
access only for copyright infringing purposes but also for 
copyright non-infringing purposes.  If the provisions are drafted to 
impose direct liability for any circumvention of measures that 
prevent access to the works—whether or not the circumvention 
occurs for the purpose of infringing copyright—no related act of 
copyright infringement in the same country will be necessary to 
find the user liable under the anti-circumvention provisions.  
Therefore, if country B has such anti-circumvention provisions, a 
user who cybertravels from country A to country B, or who 
cybertravels through servers located in country B on the way from 
country A to country C, may be liable in country B under the anti-
circumvention provisions of country B even if while cybertraveling 
the user does not infringe copyright under the laws of country B. 
In the United States, the federal circuits disagree on whether all 
of the provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(―DMCA‖) that protect technological measures196 require a 
showing of nexus between the circumvention and the copyright 
 
infringement under B‘s copyright law as an ancillary question.  It appears unlikely that 
countries would be willing to extend their protection to foreign copyright laws, but if 
countries were willing to extend their protection to foreign copyright laws, a protective 
mechanism against enforcement of copyright laws that included policies contrary to A‘s 
policies could be drafted into A‘s anti-circumvention laws. 
 195 See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text. 
 196 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).  
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infringement.
197
  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
requires a plaintiff who complains of circumvention of its 
technological protection measures ―to demonstrate that the 
circumventing technology infringes or facilitates infringement of 
the plaintiff‘s copyright.‖198  This requirement means that the 
Federal Circuit‘s interpretation of the anti-circumvention 
provisions of the DMCA is consistent with the European approach 
because it limits liability under the provision to acts that result in 
copyright infringement;
199
 other acts of circumvention that are not 
connected with existing or potential infringement are permitted.
200
  
In the cybertravel context this interpretation means that 
cybertravel, whether into the United States or from the United 
States, results in no liability under the DMCA unless there is an 
associated act of direct infringement that can be localized in the 
United States.
201
 
 
 197 However, this circuit split may be irrelevant in practice because of the courts‘ 
approach to temporary copying and the possibility of rendering such copying as copyright 
infringing through a simple contractual provision. See infra note 224 and accompanying 
text.  
 198 MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm‘t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 948 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(citing Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 
2004)).  The Chamberlain court ―conclude[d] that 17 U.S.C. § 1201 prohibits only forms 
of access that bear a reasonable relationship to the protections that the Copyright Act 
otherwise affords copyright owners. . . .  [I]t is the only meaningful reading of the 
statute.‖ Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1202–03 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004); see also Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng‘g & Consulting, Inc., 
421 F.3d 1307, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (―A court must look at the threat that the 
unauthorized circumvention potentially poses in each case to determine if there is a 
connection between the circumvention and a right protected by the Copyright Act.‖) 
(citation omitted). 
 199 Cf. Bechtold, supra note 185, at 343, 390–92 (on options that EU member countries 
have when implementing provisions on protection of technological measures). 
 200 See Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1204 (―A copyright owner seeking to impose liability 
on an accused circumventor must demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the 
circumvention at issue and a use relating to a property right for which the Copyright Act 
permits the copyright owner to withhold authorization—as well as notice that 
authorization was withheld.‖). See also Storage Tech. Corp., 421 F.3d at 1318–19 
(finding an insufficient nexus between the circumvention measure and rights protected by 
copyright law). 
 201 See infra note 276 on ―dual use‖ technologies. 
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagrees with 
the Federal Circuit‘s interpretation of the anti-circumvention 
provisions of the DMCA.
202
  The Ninth Circuit maintains, as does 
the Second Circuit,
203
 that while section 1201(b) of the Copyright 
Act is bound to an act of copyright infringement, section 1201(a) 
creates liability for circumvention per se,
204
 which means that an 
unauthorized act of circumvention leads to liability even if it is 
undertaken for purposes that are not copyright infringing.
205
  The 
Ninth Circuit‘s interpretation therefore recognizes section 1201(a) 
 
 202 MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 950. 
 203 See infra note 208. 
 204 Circumvention is illegal if it concerns any ―technological measure that effectively 
controls access to a work.‖ 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 205 Among the arguments that the Ninth Circuit listed in support of its interpretation of 
section 1201(a) as prohibiting acts of circumvention of any measures controlling access 
to copyrighted work is the fact that section 1201(a) authorizes the Librarian of Congress 
to determine when circumvention for certain ―noninfringing uses‖ of selected 
copyrighted works will be exempted from the provision. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(1)(D) 
(2006); MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 951.  The existence of the authorization to provide for 
exemptions suggests that absent an exemption, circumvention for ―noninfringing uses‖ 
will result in liability under section 1201(a).  Indeed, among the exemptions that the 
Librarian of Congress issued in July 2010 are examples of circumvention used to achieve 
what appear to be fair uses, such as circumvention of DVD Content Scrambling System 
to extract ―short portions of motion pictures into new works for the purpose of criticism 
or comment . . . [for] educational uses by college and university professors.‖  Libr. Of 
Cong., Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for 
Access Control Technologies, 75 Fed. Reg. 43825, 43827 (July 27, 2010) (codified at 37 
C.F.R. § 201.40).  However, similar fair-use-sounding uses appear among the ―classes 
considered, but not recommended,‖ id. at 43834, for which no exemption was issued. See 
37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2010).  For instance, one of the classes that was not exempted in 
2010 was ―subscription based services that offer DRM-protected streaming video where 
the provider has only made available players for a limited number of platforms.‖ 
Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access 
Control Technologies, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43834.  In this case, the Librarian denied an 
exemption that would have allowed users to watch the video on other platforms, because 
alternative devices already exist (such as DVD players) that a user interested in a non-
infringing use can utilize. Id. at 43835.  Compare this with Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 296ZE (detailing the complaint procedure and remedies 
available ―where effective technological measures prevent permitted acts‖).  For other 
approaches that EU countries have adopted for the same problem of remedying protection 
by technological measures that affect copyright non-infringing uses see Bechtold, supra 
note 185, at 343, 392. 
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as creating a new ―right to permit access to copyrighted work,‖206 a 
right that is not among the exclusive rights that copyright holders 
traditionally enjoy
207
 and that is not—as opposed to the exclusive 
rights enumerated in section 106 of the Copyright Act—subject to 
the fair use doctrine.
208
 
If the Ninth and Second Circuit Courts‘ interpretation of 
section 1201(a) prevails, cybertravel could expose a user to 
liability for the act of circumventing an access control, regardless 
of what use—copyright infringing or not—might follow, as long as 
there is access to a copyrighted work involved in the particular act 
of cybertravel and the court determines that geolocation tools are 
―effectively control[ling] access to a [copyrighted] work.‖209  This 
interpretation has far-reaching consequences for cybertravel.  Not 
only would the application of section 1201(a) result in liability for 
anyone cybertraveling from the United States, whether or not for 
copyright infringing purposes, but it would also lead to liability for 
anyone who cybertravels into the United States, regardless of 
purpose, or anyone who, through cybertravel to another country, 
accesses a website stored on a server in the United States, 
regardless of purpose.  In any of these cases, under the Ninth and 
Second Circuit‘s interpretation, a breach of section 1201(a) would 
 
 206 It could also be called the right to prevent digital trespass. 
 207 On the relevant legislative history see MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 946 (―Congress 
created a new anticircumvention right in § 1201(a)(2) independent of traditional 
copyright infringement and granted copyright owners a new weapon against copyright 
infringement in § 1201(b)(1).‖); id. at 948 (―[S]ection (a) creates a new 
anticircumvention right distinct from copyright infringement, while section (b) 
strengthens the traditional prohibition against copyright infringement.‖). See also 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 441 (2d Cir. 2001) (identifying the 
distinction between sections (a) and (b)). 
 208 See 17 U.S.C. §107 (2006). See also Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d at 443 
(rejecting the argument that circumvention of encryption technology protecting 
copyrighted material should be exempt[ed] from copyright liability ―when the material 
will be put to ‗fair uses.‘‖).  In the same case the appellants unsuccessfully attempted to 
present a constitutional argument. Id. at 444–45. See also Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip 
J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 103–04 (2010) (discussing the 
Universal City Studios case); id. at 93 (arguing that, ―[t]he golden era of fair use—if one 
ever existed—ended . . . with the enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act‖). 
 209 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(3)(B) (2006). For a discussion of the requirement of 
―effectiveness‖ of technological measures see supra note 185. 
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occur because the use of the cybertravel tools would occur in the 
United States.
210
 
The only way to remove any cybertravel to, from, or through 
the United States from the application of the DMCA as interpreted 
by the Ninth and Second Circuit Courts would be to achieve an 
exemption from the Librarian of Congress from the scope of the 
anti-circumvention provision;
211
 whether such an exemption is 
possible depends, inter alia, on whether the cybertravel is being 
employed for copyright non-infringing purposes.
212
  Whether the 
acts in which the user engages through cybertravel are infringing 
or non-infringing is decisive if the interpretation by the Federal 
Circuit is adopted, and an analysis of the user‘s possible direct 
copyright infringement liability under potentially applicable 
foreign laws is essential in determining whether the user who 
travels into or through the United States may also be directly liable 
for circumvention of technological protection measures in the 
foreign country of direct infringement. 
The viewing of a copyrighted work does not per se infringe 
copyright.  Once a work is made available to the public any user is 
free to view a work even without the copyright holder‘s 
authorization unless a ―right to permit access to [the] copyrighted 
work‖ exists, which may be the case under the interpretation by the 
Ninth and Second Circuits of section 1201(a) of the Copyright Act.  
However, reproducing a work without authorization may be an act 
of copyright infringement, and therefore if a cybertraveler (or any 
Internet user, for that matter) deliberately makes a copy of a work, 
absent a valid defense or copyright exception, the cybertraveler 
will be liable for copyright infringement.
213
  The problem is that 
 
 210 For a discussion of such a scenario, see supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 211 For a discussion of the exemption process, see supra note 205. 
 212 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(1)(D) (2006). 
 213 Here some significant differences exist between the United States and the rest of the 
world because outside the United States users do not enjoy as many limitations on the 
rights conferred by copyright as users in the United States enjoy under the U.S. fair use 
doctrine.  Generally, other countries rely on a limited number of enumerated exceptions 
to copyright. See, e.g., Amélie Blocman, Court of Cassation Pronounces on Private 
Copying Versus Technical Protective Devices, IRIS Merlin 2006-4:12/20, available at 
http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/2006/4/article20.en.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2011) 
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even if the user only intends to view the work without creating a 
copy, a copy is created anyway—automatically, by the user‘s 
computer memory in the process of displaying the work.  The 
question then becomes whether this copying in a computer‘s 
temporary memory, which occurs outside a user‘s control,214 is an 
infringing reproduction as defined by copyright law,
215
 and if so, 
whether it falls within one of the exceptions to copyright, or is 
subject to the fair use doctrine.
216
 
Existing court decisions suggest that the status of temporary 
copies will depend, inter alia, on the associated acts by the user.
217
 
As long as the temporary copies are made in the course of a lawful 
use of the work they will likely be non-infringing; however, if they 
are created as a part of an unlawful use, they may be held 
infringing.  In the United States, the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.
218
 explained that the creation of 
temporary copies on a user‘s computer may constitute fair use in a 
particular situation, but the court indicated that not every 
temporary copy will be fair use.
219
  U.K. courts have declared 
 
(discussing a case involving circumvention of technological protection measures for 
purposes of creating a private copy). 
 214 See, e.g., Jesse S. Bennett, Caching In On the Google Books Library Project: A 
Novel Approach to the Fair Use Defense and the DMCA Caching Safe Harbors, 35 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1003, 1007–22 (2008) (discussing temporary, transient, and cache copies). 
 215 See Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 
2008) (on buffer data as not being copies under the U.S. Copyright Act); Ticketmaster 
L.L.C. v. RMG Tech., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1105–06 (C.D. Ca. 2007) (on cache 
copies as copies under the U.S. Copyright Act).  
 216 See generally Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1067 
(2010) (discussing the development of the legal status of RAM copies).  On temporary 
copies and streaming see generally Frank A. Koch, Der Content bleibt im Netz – 
gesicherte Werkverwertung durch Streaming-Verfahren, 7 GRUR 574 (2010); Borghi, 
supra note 24 (exploring the copyright implications of the use of on-demand and live 
streaming technologies in the context of European case law). 
 217 There are several issues involved in decisions on temporary copies; a detailed 
analysis of all of the issues is beyond the scope of this article. See supra note 14 and 
accompanying text (generally commenting on the scope of this article). 
 218 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 219 Id. at 1169. 
[E]ven assuming such automatic copying could constitute direct 
infringement, it is a fair use in this context.  The copying function 
performed automatically by a user‘s computer to assist in accessing 
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automatically-created temporary copies to be infringing when the 
copies resulted from playing counterfeit video games;
220
 these 
copies could not benefit from the explicit exception from copyright 
protection that temporary copies enjoy under the U.K. law because 
the exception applies only if such copies are created to enable ―a 
lawful use of the work‖ with ―no independent economic 
significance.‖221 
The ―lawfulness‖ of the use of a copyrighted work does not 
depend only on the status of the acts under copyright law; the use 
of a work will be ―unlawful‖ even if it is contrary only to a 
provision in a user agreement.
222
  Therefore, for instance, if a user 
agreement limits possible uses to non-commercial purposes, using 
the work for commercial purposes will be unlawful, and any 
temporary copying associated with the commercial purposes may 
 
the Internet is a transformative use.  Moreover, . . . a cache copies no 
more than is necessary to assist the user in Internet use.  It is designed 
to enhance an individual‘s computer use, not to supersede the 
copyright holders‘ exploitation of their works.  
Id. (emphasis added).  
 Compare Ticketmaster, LLC v. RMG Tech., Inc., 507 F .Supp. 2d 1096, 1109–10 
(C.D. Cal. 2007) (discussing the status of cache copies), with Cartoon Network LP, LLLP 
v. CSC Holding, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).  In Cartoon Network, the Second 
Circuit distinguished between buffer data and ―data . . . embodied in the computer‘s 
RAM memory until the user turned the computer off.‖ Id. at 130.  The Court held that 
buffer data did not fulfill the fixation or embodiment requirement under copyright law, 
specifically the duration requirement. Id. at 127, 130. 
 220 Sony Comp. Entm‘t v. Ball, [2004] EWHC (Ch) 1738, 6 [15], (Eng.); R v. Higgs, 
[2008] EWCA (Crim) 1324 (Eng.); R v. Gilham, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2293 [25] (Eng.) 
(―[E]ven if the contents of the RAM of a game console at any one time is not a 
substantial copy, the image displayed on screen is such.‖). 
 221  Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 28A(b) (Eng.).  The second 
exception is made to enable ―a transmission of the work in a network between third 
parties by an intermediary.‖ Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 28A(a) 
(Eng.); see also Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 17(6) (Eng.) 
(explaining that infringing ―copying in relation to any description of work includes the 
making of copies which are transient or are incidental to some other use of the work‖).  
On the situation under German law see Koch, supra note 216; Thomas Busch, Zur 
urheberrechtlichen Einordnung der Nutzung von Streamingangeboten, 6 GRUR 496, 
501–03 (2011). 
 222 However, under the WIPO Copyright Treaty countries are not required to protect 
technological measures designed to protect a work beyond the protection afforded by 
copyright. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 184, at art. 11. 
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be considered infringing.
223
  The fact that an appropriately worded 
user agreement may render temporary copies infringing
224
 means 
in practice that the difference in the approaches to § 1201(a) taken 
by the Federal Circuit and the Ninth and Second Circuits might be 
marginal: the terms of the user agreement could cause courts to 
view the creation of any temporary copies as a violation of the user 
agreement, and the user could be subject to liability under  
§ 1201(a) for an act of circumvention associated with the creation 
of such copies even under the Federal Circuit‘s ―European-style‖ 
interpretation. 
Whether a user breached a user agreement will affect a user‘s 
liability for circumvention only when the user cybertravels from 
the United States; it will have no effect on a user‘s liability if the 
user cybertravels into the United States.  The user cybertraveling 
from Chile to the United States to access a copyrighted work will 
be liable under the Ninth and Second Circuits‘ interpretation of § 
 
 223 This conclusion appears to be confirmed by the decision in Newspaper Licensing 
Agency Ltd. v. Meltwater Holding BV, [2010] EWHC (Ch) 3099 (Eng.).   
[T]he temporary copies exception is solely concerned with incidental 
and intermediate copying so that any copy which is ‗consumption of 
the work‘, whether temporary or not, requires the permission of the 
copyright holder.  A person making a copy of a webpage on his 
computer screen will not have a defence under s. 28A CDPA simply 
because he has been browsing.  He must first show that it was lawful 
for him to have made the copy.  The copy is not part of the 
technological process; it is generated by his own volition.  The whole 
point of the receipt and copying of Meltwater News is to enable the 
End User to receive and read it.  Making the copy is not an essential 
and integral part of a technological process but the end which the 
process is designed to achieve. 
Id. at [109].   
The exception cannot have been intended to legitimise all copies 
made in the course of browsing or users would be permitted to watch 
pirated films and listen to pirated music.  The kind of circumstance 
where the defence may be available is where the purpose of the 
copying is to enable efficient transmission in a network between third 
parties by an intermediary, typically an internet service provider. 
 Id. at [110]; see also Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd. & Ors v. Meltwater Holding BV 
& Ors, [2011] EWCA Civ 890 (Eng.), at [30]-[35]. 
 224 See, e.g., Ticketmaster, LLC v. RMG Tech., Inc., 507 F .Supp. 2d 1096, 1110 (C.D. 
Cal. 2007)  (finding cache copying was not fair use if it occurred while the defendant 
violated the Terms of Use). 
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1201(a), regardless of whether or not he accessed the content in 
breach of a user agreement, because the Ninth and Second Circuits 
do not require a related act of copyright infringement in the United 
States to accompany the circumvention of technological measures.  
The existence or non-existence of a user agreement will also have 
no effect on the result of the assessment of the user‘s liability 
under the Federal Circuit‘s interpretation in a scenario in which the 
user cybertravels into the United States, but with the opposite 
result: the user should not be liable in the United States under § 
1201(a) of the DMCA because the temporary copy created by the 
user‘s computer in Chile does not infringe U.S. copyright law 
(though it may infringe Chilean law if Chilean law considers 
infringing the creation of temporary copies that result from an 
unlawful use of a work).  The only scenario in which a breach of a 
user agreement will make a difference is when a user cybertravels 
from the United States and the Federal Circuit‘s interpretation of § 
1201(a) of the DMCA is operative: without a user agreement the 
user‘s cybertravel for purposes that do not infringe copyright will 
be legal because the temporary copies on his computer will not 
violate a user agreement, but under a user agreement that renders 
temporary copies copyright infringing, cybertravel will be 
illegal.
225
 
b) Liability under Other Laws 
User agreements may not only generate or solidify right holder 
protection under copyright law provisions on protection of 
technological measures, but the agreements, if breached, may also 
expose end users to contractual liability.
226
  To limit cybertravel 
directly under contract, content providers may prohibit users from 
changing the information that identifies their physical location.  
 
 225 Under the Ninth and Second Circuit‘s interpretation of section 1201(a) the breach of 
a user agreement will not matter, whether a user cybertravels from or into the United 
States: all cybertravel will violate the anti-circumvention provisions of section 1201(a). 
 226 ―Contract law has rapidly become a regular companion to copyright protection as 
the structure of the Internet enables the formation of contract relationships between 
information producers and end users, either directly or through intermediaries.‖ PAUL 
GOLDSTEIN & P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, 
AND PRACTICE 334 (Oxford University Press, 2d ed. 2010). 
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For instance, the German television station SAT1 in its user 
agreement includes a provision against circumvention of the 
geographical limitations that SAT1 imposes on access to 
audiovisual content on its website.
227
  According to the agreement, 
the user must ―use the retrieved content only within the use areas 
permitted by [the media company], and may not in particular alter, 
circumvent or otherwise disregard technical measures applied by 
[the media company] to territorially limit the use.‖228  
Consequently, users cybertraveling from unpermitted areas breach 
the contract and are exposed to direct liability through the 
contractual provisions; the applicable law in user agreements like 
that of SAT1 will often be set in the contract, or may depend on 
choice-of-law provisions in the country where the cybertraveler is 
sued. 
Because cybertravel entails remote access to content stored on 
a computer or a storage facility,
229
 the question arises as to whether 
cybertravel can expose users to liability under anti-hacking laws, 
and not only to civil but also to criminal liability.  Anti-hacking 
provisions such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in the 
United States
230
 target acts of access to a computer without 
authorization,
231
 and such acts include not only physical access but 
 
 227 Nutzungsbedingungen für die Nutzung des Videoportals von Sat.1 [Terms and 
Conditions for Use of the Sat.1 Video Portal], SAT.1, http://www.sat1.de/service/ 
nutzungsbedingungen/nutzungsbedingungen-fuer-die-nutzung-des-videoportals-von-sat-1 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2011) (Ger.). 
 228 Id. § 4.1(g) (English translation). 
 229 Data storage facilities are included in the definition of a ―computer‖ in the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) (2008); see also, Council Framework 
Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks against information systems, art. 
1(a), 2005 O.J. (L 69) 48 (EU); Computer Misuse Act, 1990, c. 18, § 17(6) (Eng.).  The 
definition is likely to expand to encompass a greater number of devices; for instance, 
recently the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit confirmed that a cellular phone 
is a ―computer‖ under the provision. See United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 901 (8th 
Cir. 2011).  For a discussion of ―access,‖ see Computer Misuse Act, 1990, c. 18, § 17(2) 
(Eng.). 
 230 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
 231 E.g., id. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (―Whoever . . . intentionally accesses a computer without 
authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . information from any 
protected computer . . . .‖); see also Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 
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also remote access through a network.
232
  However, there could be 
limitations on the liability of a cybertraveler under anti-hacking 
provisions; for instance, under U.S. law a cybertraveler‘s acts 
might not result in the kind of ―damage‖233 or ―loss‖234 that would 
warrant a civil action against the cybertraveler.
235
  Perhaps the 
website operator could avoid this limitation by permitting access to 
restricted content only for a fee;
236
 cybertraveling to the United 
States to avoid the fee would then bring the cybertraveler within 
 
February 2005 on attacks against information systems, art. 2(1), 2005 O.J. (L 69) 48 
(EU); Computer Misuse Act, 1990, c. 18, §§ 1(1), 17(5), 17(8) (Eng.). 
 232 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a); see also, Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, 
Budapest, November 23, 2001, ch. 2 § 1 art. 2, available at http://conventions.coe.int 
/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/185.htm; Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, supra 
note 231, art. 1(d); Computer Misuse Act, 1990, c. 18, § 1(1) (Eng.). 
 233 The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act defines ―damage‖ as ―any impairment to the 
integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information.‖ 18 U.S.C. § 
1030(e)(8).  For a discussion of the terms ―damage‖ and ―loss‖ under the Act see, e.g., 
Multiven, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 725 F. Supp. 2d 887, 894–95 (N.D. Cal. 2010).  
 234 According to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,  
―loss‖ means any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of 
responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and 
restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition 
prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other 
consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service.  
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11). 
 235 Id. § 1030(g).  
Any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of 
this section may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain 
compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief.  
A civil action for a violation of this section may be brought only if 
the conduct involves 1 of the factors set forth in subclauses (I), (II), 
(III), (IV), or (V) of subsection (c)(4)(A)(i) . . . . 
 Id.  The only potentially relevant factor would be  
loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period (and, for purposes 
of an investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding brought by the 
United States only, loss resulting from a related course of conduct 
affecting 1 or more other protected computers) aggregating at least 
$5,000 in value . . . .  
Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I); see also EU Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, supra 
note 231, at art. 2(1) (allowing EU member states not to criminalize certain acts of 
accessing information systems in cases that are considered ―minor‖). 
 236 This solution addresses only the issue of the magnitude of the loss; it does not 
address the potential problem of the nature of the loss as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 
1030(e)(11). 
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the scope of the Act.
237
  Although making access from abroad 
contingent upon the payment of a fee might be a straightforward 
and simple solution to implement technically, it might not always 
be possible; in many cases website operators employ geolocation 
tools because they either do not have rights to make the content 
available to users from certain countries or they do not want to be 
regulated by the laws of those countries.
238
 
Although allowing access from countries from which access is 
restricted, even for a fee, might not always be an option, one 
business implementation on the horizon may test this arrangement.  
The BBC announced in November 2010 its plan to offer to users 
connecting to its website from outside the United Kingdom some 
of the content that it currently makes available only to users 
connecting from inside the United Kingdom.
239
  Making access 
from abroad contingent upon the payment of a fee while 
maintaining free access for users connecting from inside the 
United Kingdom could result in liability not only for users who 
cybertravel to avoid payment of the fee but also for those who 
facilitate the cybertravel to the United Kingdom by providing the 
tools that enable the cybertravel.  Apart from making applicable 
various legal doctrines to prevent unwanted cybertravel, such a 
pay-per-foreign-view system will compete with the services of 
mainstream cybertravel providers who charge for their tools that 
are designed to accomplish the same result—the viewing of the 
restricted foreign content.  The next section analyzes the question 
of liability of cybertravel providers, whether or not those using 
their tools circumvent a fee when cybertraveling. 
 
 237 See infra note 246 and accompanying text for a further discussion of how making 
content available for a fee might bring a cybertravel provider within the scope of not only 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in the United States but also national provisions 
implementing the 1998 EU Conditional Access Directive.  
 238 See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the reasons for using geolocation tools to 
limit access to content. 
 239 Jonathan Wynne-Jones, BBC Aims to Gain from Global iPlayer, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 
7, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyand 
telecoms/digital-media/8114911/BBC-aims-to-gain-from-global-iPlayer.html. 
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2. Liability of Cybertravel Providers 
Although individual cybertravelers may be subject to direct 
liability in either the country where they are physically located or 
the country to which they cybertravel, they might not be the best 
targets for enforcement actions; as has been shown in the relatively 
short history of the Internet, the most valuable enforcement targets 
are often intermediaries.  Enforcement actions against individual 
Internet users can be highly inefficient, and the costs of detection 
and enforcement will often be excessive when compared to any 
benefits that might be achieved through such enforcement—both in 
terms of recourse against individual users and the deterrence of 
other users;
240
 enforcement against intermediaries is likely to yield 
better results.  In the case of cybertravel these intermediaries are 
the providers of cybertravel tools. 
 Cybertravel providers should be concerned about the 
secondary liability they might face in connection with end users 
who use their cybertravel tools for direct infringement;
241
 however, 
providers might also need to be concerned about exposing 
themselves to direct liability.  For example, in the case of South 
Africa, it is possible that cybertravel providers could be held liable 
as ―persons, entities or organisations which facilitate the provision 
of [illegal] on-line gambling.‖242  Cybertravel providers could also 
face direct liability under copyright law provisions that protect 
technological measures; national implementing provisions 
concerning the measures cover acts of manufacturing, importation, 
offering to the public, providing, and otherwise trafficking in 
technologies for circumventing technological measures.
243
  For 
providers to be liable, some nexus will generally be required 
between the acts of facilitated circumvention and potential or 
 
 240 For a discussion of the problem of ―asserting control at the source‖ see Zittrain, 
supra note 116, at 207–09. See also Goldstein & Hugenholtz, supra note 226, at 330–31. 
 241 See infra for a discussion of the potential indirect liability of cybertravel providers. 
 242 On-line Gambling Transactions Are Outlawed in South Africa, GAUTENG GAMBLING 
BD., http://www.ggb.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3: 
newsflash-2&catid=3:newsflash (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
 243 E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1) (2006).  While the Federal Circuit Court views 
these DMCA provisions as codifying forms of secondary liability, the provisions are 
drafted to create direct liability. 
 2012] THE FUTURE OF CYBERTRAVEL 629 
existing copyright infringement.
244
  However, in the United States 
no nexus is required if the Ninth and Second Circuits‘ 
interpretation of section 1201(a) applies, and cybertravel providers 
may be liable for providing circumvention tools even without a 
nexus.
245
 
Cybertravel providers face another problem if their tools allow 
users to bypass the payment of a fee for access.  As explained 
earlier,
246
 website operators can decide to provide content for free 
in countries where access is not restricted but charge a pay-per-
foreign-view fee to users accessing the same programming from 
other countries.  If cybertravel providers facilitate user access to 
websites without the payment of a required fee, the providers could 
be exposed in the United States to liability under the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act,
247
 and similarly, in the EU, the providers 
could be liable under national provisions implementing the 1998 
EU Conditional Access Directive,
248
 which protects services that 
limit access in order to collect remuneration
249
 from ―illicit devices 
which allow access to these services free of charge.‖250  Infringing 
activities under the Directive include the manufacture, import, 
distribution, sale, rental, possession, installation, maintenance, 
 
 244 It is debatable whether the same nexus is required in the EU for the protection of 
computer programs against ―any act of putting into circulation, or the possession for 
commercial purposes of, any means the sole intended purpose of which is to facilitate . . .  
circumvention of any technical device which may have been applied to protect a 
computer program.‖ Council Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs, art. 7(1)(c), 
2009 O.J. (L 111) 52. 
 245 See supra Part IV.A.1.a (discussing the circuit split). 
 246 See id.  
 247 See supra text accompanying notes 230–35; see also 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(6)(A) 
(2008). 
 248 Directive 98/84 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 
1998 on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access, 
1998 O.J. (L 320) 54 [hereinafter 1998 EU Conditional Access Directive]; see also 
European Convention on the Legal Protection of Services Based on, or Consisting of, 
Conditional Access, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Jan. 24, 2001), http://conventions.coe.int 
/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/178.htm. 
 249 1998 EU Conditional Access Directive, supra note 248, at recitals 3, 6.  
 250 Compare 1998 EU Conditional Access Directive, supra note 248, at recital 6 and 47 
U.S.C. § 605 (2006) (unauthorized publication or use of communications), with 47 
U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (unauthorized reception of cable service). 
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replacement and use for commercial purposes
251
 of ―any 
equipment or software designed or adapted to give access to a 
protected service.‖252 
Even if their cybertravel tools are not used to bypass the 
payment of a fee, cybertravel providers should be concerned about 
their liability under anti-hacking provisions.  These provisions 
target not only hackers but also those who provide tools for 
hacking, such as ―any password or similar information through 
which a computer may be accessed without authorization.‖253  
Cybertravel tools could be viewed as such ―similar information,‖ 
and therefore, tool providers could face civil and criminal liability 
under anti-hacking laws, subject to the limitations mentioned 
above that are applicable to cybertravelers.
254
  Additionally, 
limitations associated with territoriality may exist in countries 
where the liability of providers of hacking tools is drafted in the 
form of secondary liability. 
Another danger for cybertravel providers is direct liability for 
secondary transmission.  Other services that resemble cybertravel 
have been designed to ―place shift,‖ or to facilitate the viewing of 
content elsewhere that is broadcast or made available to a limited 
geographical area, and some of these similar services have been 
challenged based on their retransmission of the content.  For 
instance, in Japan a service called ManekiTV offered ―a location-
free, Internet-based transmission‖ of Japanese television programs 
for a fee;
255
 in January 2011 the Supreme Court of Japan held that 
the service infringed copyright.
256
  In the United States, a similar 
 
 251 1998 EU Conditional Access Directive, supra note 248, at art. 4. 
 252 Id. at art. 2(e). 
 253 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(6) (2008).  Under national provisions that implement Article 5 
of EU Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA in the EU member states, such tool 
providers could be criminally liable. See Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 
the European Union of 24 February 2005 on attacks against information systems, 2005 
O.J. (L 69) 67, 69.  For limitations on liability under that legislation, see supra notes 
233–35 and accompanying text. See also Computer Misuse Act, 1990, c. 18, § 3A (Eng.). 
 254 See supra notes 230–35 and accompanying text. 
 255 Aritake, supra note 23; see also MANEKITV, supra note 19.  
 256 See Aritake, supra note 23.  
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service has been attacked in WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc..
257
  ivi‘s online 
TV player allows users to view on the Internet broadcasts that were 
originally available over the air.
258
  In February 2011, the Federal 
District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a 
preliminary injunction against ivi, Inc.,
259
 determining that the 
service is not eligible for the statutory license established by the 
U.S. Copyright Act for cable services.
260
 
It may be argued that there is an important difference between 
place shifting services and cybertravel.  While the technologies 
employed by ManekiTV and ivi require that the services retransmit 
the signal to provide access to additional viewers, cybertravel 
technologies, with one exception, do not involve the retransmission 
of a signal.  Instead of retransmitting a signal, cybertravel tools 
relocate the user in cyberspace so that the user can access the 
content directly from the original website.  The tools do not 
retransmit the content; rather, they ―shift‖ the perceived location of 
the viewer.  The one exception might be website cybertravel 
tools—websites that display web pages based on users‘ requests.  
These tools could be described as operating on the principle of 
retransmission; however, as noted earlier, this type of tool is 
unlikely to be utilized for content streaming because it involves 
slow connection speeds.
261
 
 
 257 WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 258 IVI, supra note 16. 
 259 WPIX, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d at 622.  Other services, such as Slingbox, a U.S. service 
that allows users to ―[w]atch and control [their] TV shows over the Internet from 
anywhere in the world,‖ could face similar challenges depending on their particular 
technology. SLINGBOX, http://www.slingbox.com/go/slingbox (last visited Feb. 2, 2012). 
The Slingbox concept is similar to the bypassing of geolocation that is described in Part 
III of this paper as ―self-sustained‖ cybertravel because Slingbox also requires a user‘s 
own device (the Slingbox) located in another country.  A similar service in Japan is 
Rokuraku. See H. Kikuchi, Comment on the Rokuraku II decision, 41 INT‘L REV. INTELL. 
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 860 (2010); see also ROKURAKU, http://www.rokuraku.com/ 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
 260 17 U.S.C §111(c)(1) (2006).  The Register of Copyrights has proposed that the 
provision be phased out. Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act: Section 302 
Report, REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.copyright.gov/reports/ 
section302-report.pdf.  For additional examples see, supra notes 16–21 and 
accompanying text. 
 261 See supra Part III. 
  
632 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:567 
Although the phrase ―making available‖ that is used in the 
1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty and the 2001 EU Information 
Society Directive might seem to capture the involvement of 
cybertravel providers in the acts of cybertravel better than 
retransmission, public performance, or public display,
262
 ―making 
available‖ might not cover cybertravel providers‘ conduct.  The 
right to communicate a copyrighted work to the public in Article 8 
of the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty and Article 3 of the 2001 EU 
Information Society Directive
263
 indeed includes the component of 
―making available to the public.‖264  However, the Agreed 
Statement Concerning Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
suggests that the component does not create specific liability for 
passive behavior,
265
 and explains that Article 8 does not impose 
liability for acts of ―mere provision of physical facilities for 
enabling or making a communication.‖  Similarly, recital 23 of the 
2001 EU Information Society Directive states that the right 
―should cover any . . . transmission or retransmission of a work to 
the public‖ and that the ―right should not cover any other acts.‖266  
The Directive is different from the WIPO Treaty in that, with 
respect to holders of rights to specific subject matter in Article 
3(2),
267
 the Directive does appear to create a new ―right to make 
 
 262 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4)–(5) (2006); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 
F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 263 See 2001 EU Information Society Directive, supra note 187, at art. 3; Case C-
306/05, Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v. Rafael Hoteles 
SA, 2006 E.C.R. I-11519. 
 264 WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 8, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 36 
I.L.M. 65, 70 (1996); 2001 EU Information Society Directive, supra note 187, at art. 3. 
 265 The phrase is used to clarify the scope of the term ―public.‖  ―[T]he making 
available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public may 
access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.‖ WIPO 
Copyright Treaty art. 8, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65, 70 
(1996). See also the definition of performing or displaying a work ―publicly‖ in 17 
U.S.C. §101 (2006) (providing the definition of performing or displaying a work 
―publicly‖); Goldstein & Hugenholtz, supra note 226, at 328–29. 
 266 2001 EU Information Society Directive, supra note 187, at recital 23. 
 267 The ―exclusive right to authorize or prohibit the making available to the public‖ is 
provided to  
performers, of fixations of their performances; . . . for phonogram 
producers, of their phonograms; . . . for the producers of the first 
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available to the public,‖ which ―cover[s] all acts of making 
available such subject-matter to members of the public,‖268 
meaning acts that are not restricted to transmission or 
retransmission.
269
  However, the Directive repeats that ―[t]he mere 
provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a 
communication does not in itself amount to communication,‖270 
leaving open the question of whether providing cybertravel tools is 
equivalent to providing ―facilities‖ and thus exempted from 
liability under the ―making available‖ provision of the Directive.271 
In the United States, cybertravel providers might benefit from an 
exemption that passive carriers enjoy from liability for the 
―secondary transmission of a performance or display of a work.‖272 
Indirect liability may be limited by safe harbor provisions that 
protect Internet intermediaries from secondary liability for Internet 
users‘ conduct; the provisions may also apply to cybertravel 
providers.
273
  Safe harbor provisions apply to Internet service 
 
fixations of films, of the original and copies of their films; . . . for 
broadcasting organization, of fixations of their broadcasts, whether 
these broadcasts are transmitted by wire or over the air, including by 
cable or satellite.  
2001 EU Information Society Directive, supra note 187, at art. 3(2). 
 268 Id. at recital 24. 
 269 On conflicting European decisions concerning hyperlinks, see Bechtold, supra note 
185, at 343, 361. 
 270 2001 EU Information Society Directive, supra note 187, at recital 27. 
 271 It speaks in favor of such an interpretation that recital 25 of the Directive seems to 
suggest that Article 3(2) should target on-demand transmission services. 2001 EU 
Information Society Directive, supra note 187, at recital 25.  However, recital 23 of the 
Directive calls for a broad interpretation of the right. Id. at recital 23. See also Case C-
306/05, Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v. Rafael Hoteles 
SA, 2006 E.C.R. I-11519, at par. 36.  In ITV v. TV CatchUp Ltd., Justice Floyd opined 
that TV CatchUP does not ―merely provide technical means to ensure or improve 
reception . . . It is not merely supportive of the original exploitation of the work.‖ ITV v. 
TV CatchUp Ltd. [2011] EWHC 1874 (Pat), [98].  See also Bechtold, supra note 185, at 
343, 361.  As Goldstein and Hugenholtz note, ―[p]osting hyperlinks to works already 
available on websites, however, is not an independent act of communication.‖ Goldstein 
& Hugenholtz, supra note 226, at 329–30. 
 272 17 U.S.C. § 111(a) (2010). 
 273 E.g., Id. § 512; Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular 
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, arts. 12–15, 2000 O.J. (L 178). 
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providers without regard to the location of users who connect to 
their networks; therefore, in the case of the most basic cybertravel, 
which consists of a dial-up connection to a foreign Internet service 
provider,
274
 the fact that the user connects from another country 
should not defeat the safe harbor that the service provider enjoys.  
Even cybertravel providers that are not Internet service providers 
can probably benefit from the provisions of the safe harbors that 
are designed for transitory digital network communications.
275
 
Not all countries offer safe harbor provisions for Internet 
intermediaries, and even those countries that do offer safe harbor 
provisions may limit their safe harbors to secondary liability for 
infringements of only certain laws.  Moreover, the safe harbor 
provisions will certainly not protect cybertravel providers from 
liability for actively inducing infringements.  To limit their indirect 
liability, cybertravel providers will likely market their tools in a 
manner that does not suggest that they are promoting copyright 
infringement or other rights infringement by end users.
276
  For 
instance, instead of advertising that their tools will allow users to 
watch specific copyrighted content, the providers may choose 
nonspecific language to advertise the fact that their tools may 
enable users to watch television programs in general.
277
 
Cybertravel providers may also attempt to limit their exposure 
to indirect liability by disassociating their activities from the 
countries from which users, who use their tools, cybertravel.
278
  
 
 274 See supra Part III. 
 275 E.g., 17 U.S.C. §512(a); Directive 2000/31/EC, supra note 273, at art. 12 (―Mere 
conduit‖). 
 276  On the ―dual use‖ technologies that may serve both legal and illegal purposes see 
Stefan Bechtold, supra note 185, at 343, 387. ―In general, in such ‗dual use‘ cases, [the 
provision on protection of technological measures] probably applies as long as the 
technological measure is not misused primarily for the purpose to substitute the absence 
of copyright protection by technological protection.‖ Id. at 387; see also Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 936–41 (2005). 
 277 E.g., MY EXPAT NETWORK, supra note 150 (Note: the U.K. top-level domain name, 
the price in British pounds, the website strictly addressing British expatriates living 
outside the United Kingdom, and the language about watching ―UK TV abroad.‖). 
 278 See Martin Senftleben, commentary on the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, in 
CONCISE EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW 87, 102–03; see also Bechtold, supra note 185, at 
343, 362. 
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Although the likelihood of success of such attempts is 
questionable, it is instructive to review their model.
279
  For 
example, a cybertravel provider in Hungary might offer a 
cybertravel tool to Hungarians who travel abroad and wish to view 
Hungarian programs online that are not accessible outside of 
Hungary.  The provider could argue that because any acts of 
potential direct copyright infringement would be committed by 
users outside Hungary, and therefore under foreign (non-
Hungarian) copyright laws, no indirect liability of the cybertravel 
provider for copyright infringement should arise in Hungary under 
Hungarian law.  Of course, the provider would also claim that it 
had not directed its operations at the countries in which acts of 
direct infringement occur (all countries other than Hungary), but 
only at Hungary, and thereby attempt to limit its exposure to 
personal jurisdiction outside Hungary.
280
  Indeed, a provider could 
support its claim if its website were in Hungarian, as that would 
suggest that it had only targeted customers inside the sole country 
in which Hungarian is widely spoken and understood.
281
 
Although existing laws do not address cybertravel, a number of 
legal doctrines may apply to various aspects of cybertravel, and it 
is for the courts to decide which, if any, of these existing doctrines 
apply.  The lack of any specific legislative provisions addressing 
cybertravel is not surprising given the brief history of the use of 
geolocation tools to limit access to certain content and the 
relatively recent advent of cybertravel.  So far there appear to be 
no cases raising the question of the legality of cybertravel, whether 
in the context of copyright law or of other laws pertaining to 
conduct on the Internet.  Whether or not courts decide to deem 
 
 279 See supra note 277. 
 280 One could be found secondarily liable for copyright infringement in the country 
where direct infringement occurred. E.g., Columbia Pictures Ind., Inc. v. Gary Fung, No. 
CV 06-5578 SVW (JCx), 2009 WL 6355911, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009); 
Armstrong v. Virgin Records, Ltd., 91 F. Supp. 2d 628, 634–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 281 See Joined Cases C-585/08 & C-144/09, Peter Pammer v. Reederei Karl Schluter 
GmbH & Co KG and Hotel Aplenhof GesmbH v. Oliver Heller (2010), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62008CJ0585:EN: 
HTML (describing the European Union‘s treatment of websites for purposes of personal 
jurisdiction). 
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cybertravel legal under existing laws, it is time to discuss the future 
of cybertravel. 
B. Should Cybertravel be Legal? 
Although current legal regimes do not directly address 
cybertravel and court cases dealing with cybertravel appear to be 
nonexistent, it would be a mistake to think that cybertravel will 
continue to remain outside the scope of legal inquiry.
282
  The need 
to erect borders on the Internet to prevent the undesirable results of 
the application of cyberlaw 2.0
283
 seems to dictate only one 
possible future for cybertravel: making it illegal.  Without making 
or keeping cybertravel illegal, the goal of those who want a 
territorial partitioning of the Internet will be defeated or 
significantly endangered.  Therefore it seems that, regardless of its 
current status, it is imperative that cybertravel be declared 
illegal.
284
  This section discusses the apparently grim and 
inevitable fate of cybertravel and then attempts to identify potential 
arguments for saving it. 
1. Cybertravel as a Misrepresentation of One‘s True Location 
There currently exists no right to know a user‘s true IP address, 
and no corresponding obligation for a user to reveal his true IP 
address; however, this could change in light of the developments 
outlined above.
285
  The developments appear to dictate that in the 
future a user‘s IP address be unchangeable; if that be the case, an 
IP address will constitute an element of a user‘s digital identity that 
the user would not be permitted to alter.  The user would have a 
 
 282 Cf. Yvette Joy Liebesman, The Wisdom of Legislating for Anticipated Technological 
Advancements, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 154, 157 (2010) (warning that ―we 
should proceed with caution in allowing the potential effects of either technology in its 
infancy or future unrealized technology to influence our policy decisions before the 
science has had a chance to mature and develop, and its effects on society better 
determined.‖).  
 283 See supra notes 5, 51–58 and accompanying text. 
 284 Such appears to be the solution in the proposed Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 
112th Cong., § 102(c)(4)(A)(ii) (2011). 
 285 In theory, at least, cases could exist in which changing an IP address could be 
viewed as an act of misrepresentation. See, e.g., Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) 
(2006) (misrepresentation of the origin of goods). 
 2012] THE FUTURE OF CYBERTRAVEL 637 
disclosure obligation that he would have to fulfill by always 
presenting himself to the outside world with his true IP address. 
The change from IPv4 to IPv6 may support the idea of non-
changeability of IP addresses.  If one of the virtues of IPv6 is the 
ability to identify a particular device by its IP address, allowing 
users to change the IP addresses of their devices, even if only 
temporarily, would render the virtue worthless.  Experts have 
promised that having IP addresses permanently assigned or 
embedded in various devices will be an advance that will spur 
further innovation in the online world because new applications 
may thereafter be developed to target specific devices connected to 
the Internet, and these devices will no longer be limited to 
computers or cell phones but will include devices such as cars, 
refrigerators, washing machines and other appliances.
286
  Allowing 
cybertravel would hinder this development because applications 
could not rely on the user leaving the fixed IP address of a device 
unaltered. 
In addition to being inconsistent with the interests of the parties 
aligned in support of IPv6, cybertravel also appears to be 
inconsistent with the desires of governments and the private sector 
to erect borders on the Internet.  In spite of the zeal of true Internet 
enthusiasts to remain faithful to the original concept of the 
borderless network,
287
 there are reasons why both governments and 
the private sector need a territorial partitioning of the Internet.  Use 
of geolocation tools by website operators appears to be a 
reasonable method of erecting borders on the network;
288
 however, 
the functioning of these tools can be undermined by cybertravel, 
which evades the tools and defeats the partitioning.  Outlawing 
cybertravel seems to be a logical answer in support of the border-
building process. 
 
 286 See, e.g., ICANN IPv6 News Conference: Miami, Fl., YOUTUBE (Feb. 3, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gveJs6YRYXU. 
 287 See supra Part I. 
 288 See id. 
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2. Cybertravel and the Right to Obscure One‘s Location289 
The ability to assign permanent IP addresses to every device 
connected to the Internet, and the ability to attribute acts on the 
Internet to those devices and possibly to particular persons, raises 
serious privacy concerns.
290
  This possibility explains an increasing 
interest, or even determination, among Internet users for options to 
change their IP addresses as a way of maintaining their privacy on 
the Internet.  Indeed, services already exist that offer a simple way 
to obscure information about users‘ Internet connections by 
altering users‘ IP addresses.291  These anonymizing services do not 
fit the definition of cybertravel because users do not necessarily 
use the services to evade geolocation to ―travel‖ to another 
country; users seeking anonymization often want only to obscure 
their own IP address but do not care about the location of the 
replacement IP address.
292
 
It might appear that the debate about the availability of 
anonymous Internet browsing relates to the future of 
cybertravel;
293
 however, there is not necessarily a link between the 
legality of anonymization and the legality of cybertravel.  The law 
may permit a change of IP address for the purposes of 
anonymization, yet require that the replacement IP address also be 
located in the jurisdiction of the user‘s physical location.  This 
approach would achieve a certain level of anonymization that 
might be sufficient for many purposes,
294
 and yet maintain the 
desired localization specificity of the IP address.  The localization 
might not be detailed enough to bring the user localized 
 
 289 I am indebted for this term to Megan M. Carpenter, Associate Professor of Law at 
Texas Wesleyan School of Law, who proposed its use in this context. 
 290 If you were concerned about someone hacking into your computer you might decide 
that having someone hack into the contents of your refrigerator would be worse.  
 291 See supra Part III (discussing examples of such concerns). 
 292 See id. 
 293 See, e.g., Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1417, 1455–60 (2009) (discussing anonymization on the Internet). 
 294 Anonymization in the same jurisdiction might not, in fact, always be sufficient–for 
example, if the jurisdiction is too small or has an insufficient number of Internet users 
with the same characteristics, identification of the particular user might be possible.  
Similarly, anonymization within the same jurisdiction will not work if the desire for 
anonymization is combined with a need to cybertravel. 
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information about restaurants, for example, but would be 
sufficiently detailed to allow website operators to detect the 
jurisdiction from which the user is connecting and adjust the 
accessibility of content accordingly.  This solution would allow 
users a certain degree of anonymization but give them no ability to 
obscure their location to the point of avoiding compliance with 
territorially-defined laws and regulations. 
Similarly, legalization of cybertravel does not automatically 
dictate a legalization of anonymization; depending on the structure 
of legal cybertravel, legalization of anonymization might be 
unnecessary and also undesirable.  For instance, legal cybertravel 
might be conditioned upon the use of a digital passport that would 
identify not only the user‘s location or domicile but also the user‘s 
identity or account;
295
 such a condition would permit cybertravel 
but require that the user maintain accurate information about his or 
her identity.  This solution would allow cybertravel but defeat 
anonymization; users would be able to obscure their current 
location if, for instance, the digital passport required information 
about the user‘s domicile or residence but not the user‘s current 
location. 
If the future of the Internet includes permanently assigned IP 
addresses, anonymous Internet speech may have to be safeguarded 
by means other than the obscuring of one‘s IP address, and 
alternative means are likely to require careful attention to the 
protection of privacy.
296
  It is possible that privacy law could 
develop before any policy decisions are made concerning 
anonymization or cybertravel, and some experts will undoubtedly 
argue that as privacy protection becomes stronger for IP addresses, 
the arguments in favor of allowing users to change their IP 
addresses should yield.
297
  Some experts may present this outcome 
 
 295 See infra Part IV.C for a discussion of the impact of selecting the domicile instead of 
the current location. 
 296 There will be someone in the process—some other ―anonymizer‖—who will know 
the IP address of the Internet user; therefore, privacy rules will have to protect the user 
from having this information disclosed. 
 297 On the current difficulties of defining IP addresses as personal data or personally 
identifiable data see the following recent decisions: Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal 
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as a necessary compromise: the law will protect a user‘s personally 
identifiable information, but the user will be expected to keep it 
personally identifiable.  Although information subject to privacy 
protection must lead to the identification of a particular person (by 
definition), there seems to be no link between providing protection 
to such information and requiring that the particular person not 
change the information.  The result of the debate may impact the 
design of cybertravel but should not be dispositive of the question 
of whether cybertravel should be legal or not; the answers to the 
questions about cybertravel and anonymization should not be 
mutually dependent. 
3. Cybertravel as an Equivalent to Physical Travel 
Because the developments outlined earlier appear to dictate 
that cybertravel be illegal in the future, it is difficult to find an 
argument for allowing cybertravel.  One attempt is to analogize 
cybertravel to physical travel and claim an equivalent right to 
travel in cyberspace.  If cybertravel is considered equivalent to 
physical travel, it can be argued that cybertravel should be 
permissible in some form and enjoy the same protections that 
physical travel—and in particular international travel—does. 
The right to travel internationally has been recognized in the 
United States as a constitutional right,
298
 and is implied as a human 
right in international human rights treaties.
299
  In the 1958 case 
 
Supreme Court] Sept. 8, 2010, 136 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN 
BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] II 508 (Switz.). (―It is impossible to determine in the abstract 
whether IP addresses [particularly dynamically assigned addresses] are personal data.‖ 
Id.); Media C.A.T. Ltd. v. Malcolm Adams et al., [2011] EWPCC (En.) 6, [91]. See also 
Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et 
Éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document. 
jsf?text=&docid=115202&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=
1&cid=763036; see generally Joshua J. McIntyre, Balancing Expectations of Online 
Privacy: Why Internet Protocol (IP) Addresses Should Be Protected As Personally 
Identifiable Information, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 895 (2011). 
 298 See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Timothy Zick, The First 
Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective: Toward a More Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 
B. C. L. R. 941, 954 (2011). 
 299 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10 1948, G.A. Res. 217A U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 67th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 13(2) (1948) (includes ―the right 
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Kent v. Dulles,
300
 the Supreme Court of the United States discussed 
the constitutional right to travel internationally and explained the 
underpinnings of that right, surveyed the roots of the right in U.S. 
history and traditions,
301
 and quoted Zechariah Chafee on social 
values associated with the freedom of movement.
302
  Although 
some of the values cited in Kent v. Dulles are not pertinent to the 
present discussion of cybertravel (values of allowing families to 
reunite, persons to work in other countries),
303
 others, such as 
educational values and the values of learning different viewpoints, 
are very relevant.
304
  ―In many different ways,‖ the Supreme Court 
quoted Chafee, ―direct contact with other countries contributes to 
sounder decisions at home.‖305  It would seem that cybertravel is as 
much associated with these values as physical travel is.
306
 
Even if, by analogy with physical travel, the right to travel 
internationally is extended to cybertravel, the right to cybertravel 
would be subject to limitation through governmental regulation 
analogous to the regulation that is applicable to physical travel.  In 
the United States the right to travel internationally is subject to 
rational basis scrutiny, which allows the government to use 
reasonable means to limit the right as long as the limitation is 
 
to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country‖);  Protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, Strasbourg, September 16, 1963, art. 2(2) 
(includes the freedom ―to leave any country, including his own‖); International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12(2) (includes a provision that ―[e]veryone shall be 
free to leave any country, including his own‖); American Convention for Human Rights, 
Opened for Signature Nov. 22, 1969, Ch II, art. 22(2) (provides that ―every person has 
the right to leave any country freely, including his own‖). 
 300 357 U.S. 116 (1958). 
 301 Id. at 125–26. 
 302 Id. at 126–27 (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 
CONSTITUTION OF 1787 195–96 (Univ. of Kansas Press 1956)). 
 303 Id. (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 
1787 195–96 (Univ. of Kansas Press 1956)).  In some contexts the right to be allowed to 
work in another country could require the right to cybertravel. 
 304 Id. (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 
1787 195–96 (Univ. of Kansas Press 1956)). 
 305 Id. at 127 (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION 
OF 1787 195–96 (Univ. of Kansas Press 1956)). 
 306 But cf. Zick, supra note 298, at 1004 (noting that the decisions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court that followed Kent v. Dulles ―effectively neutered any First Amendment liberty to 
travel abroad for purposes of inquiry and information-gathering‖). 
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rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.
307
  
Similarly, international treaties on human rights recognize that the 
right to travel across national borders may be limited.
308
  For 
instance, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, to which the United States has been a party since 1977 and 
which it ratified in 1992, allows restrictions of the right as long as 
the restrictions ―are provided by law, are necessary to protect 
national security, public order (ordre public), public health or 
morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with 
the other rights recognized in the  . . . Covenant.‖309  One of the 
generally accepted restrictions is the requirement that persons 
traveling across national borders carry passports that identify them 
and thereby allow countries to monitor the movement of persons.  
Indeed, it could be foreseen that in the digital environment 
countries could impose a similar requirement for cybertravel. 
Some might argue that there is an even stronger argument for 
the protection of cybertravel—the right of access to information.310  
International treaties, including treaties to which the United States 
is a party, define the right of freedom of expression to include the 
right to access information from wherever it may be located.  For 
example, Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
protects the right ―to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.‖311  In the 
United States some commentators have advocated that the right to 
 
 307 See Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 178 (1978).  This is different from 
domestic travel, which is protected by a higher level of scrutiny. Id. at 176–78. 
 308 But the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not include a provision 
on limitations of the right. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217 (III) A, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 309 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 12(3), Dec. 16, 1966, 99 
U.N.T.S. 171; see also Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights art. 2(3), 
Sept. 16, 1963, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; American Convention on Human Rights art. 22(3), 
Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143. 
 310 On the potential overlap between the right to travel and the right to free speech see 
Zick, supra note 298, at 954–57, 985–86, 1004–12. 
 311 Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19, G.A. Res 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (emphasis added). See infra note 320 for other treaties 
that protect the right to seek, receive and impart information without territorial 
limitations. 
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travel internationally be derived from the free speech protection of 
the First Amendment rather than from the Due Process Clause 
because of the values encompassed by international travel.
312
  
Advocates of this view could use cybertravel to help persuade 
countries to acknowledge this link between the right to 
international travel and the right to free speech; to many, the link 
may be more relevant in the context of cybertravel than physical 
travel.
313
  If countries refuse to link the concepts, of course, 
equating cybertravel to physical travel would not improve 
cybertravel‘s chances of benefitting from the protection of access 
to information. 
Any attempt to extend the rights of international travel or 
access to information to cyberspace would certainly not be the first 
attempt to assert constitutional and human rights in cyberspace.
314
  
The first constitutional right to receive attention in the context of 
the Internet was the right to free speech; users have asserted this 
right when faced with limitations on Internet speech imposed by 
other countries.  The Yahoo!
315
 and Viewfinder
316
 cases are 
examples of cases in which U.S. courts have denied recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments because of the significant 
 
 312 Zick, supra note 298, at 1005, 1008; see also supra INTRODUCTION (discussing the 
values associated with travel). 
 313 Zick is concerned that the focus on protecting free speech on the Internet will 
distract attention from the need to protect international travel: 
[I]t may be tempting to reason that because speech can transcend 
territorial borders via the Internet, there is less need for a fundamental 
right of cross-border movement.  But even in the digital era, freedom 
of speech and other First Amendment liberties still depend upon 
rights of cross-border movement and trans-border information-
gathering. . . . [I]t remains important that we have a constitutional 
foundation for cross-border movement and intermingling.  
Zick, supra note 298, at 1004–05.   
 Cybertravel is an activity on the Internet that could provide additional support for 
the right to travel internationally.  
 314 E.g., Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the Internet, Version 1.1 for 
Consultation, INTERNET RIGHTS & PRINCIPLES COAL., http://www.freedomofexpression. 
org.uk/files/DRAFTVersion1.1%283%29.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). 
 315 Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L‘Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 
1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev‘d en banc, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 316 Sarl Louis Feraud Intl. v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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public policy embedded in the U.S. constitutional guarantee of free 
speech.  In line with these cases and other cases involving foreign 
libel judgments and speech on the Internet, the 2010 SPEECH Act 
ensures that no foreign defamation judgments will be recognized in 
the United States unless they comport with U.S. standards of free 
speech.
317
 
One problem in asserting the right to free speech on the 
Internet is that the functioning of the Internet depends on non-state 
actors, and only when constitutional rights or human rights involve 
governmental action that must be effectuated on the Internet by 
non-state actors (such as recognition and enforcement of a foreign 
judgment, or content filtering mandated by the government) will an 
assertion of constitutional rights on the Internet be possible.
318
  
Given the importance of the Internet, it is not surprising that 
experts such as Christoph B. Graber are calling for an extension of 
the rights to bind private actors on the Internet;
319
 the actors to be 
bound by the rights should be the providers of critical Internet 
infrastructure, such as Internet service providers, intermediaries, 
and others who are providers of web services that are unique and 
indispensible to the usability of the Internet.  Graber gives an 
example of preemptive filtering that demonstrates the risk of 
serious intrusions into the right to ―communicative freedom,‖ 
which in his definition includes not only the right to free speech, 
but also the ―passive‖ aspect of the right, which is the right of 
access to information—a right that is embedded in international 
human rights treaties.
320
  The filtering in Graber‘s example is 
 
 317 Securing and Protecting our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage 
(SPEECH) Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101–05 (2010). 
 318 On ―Constitutional Rights in the Private Sphere of the Internet‖ from a comparative 
perspective see Graber, supra note 42, at 17–20. 
 319 See generally Graber, supra note 42; see also Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without 
Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 
988 (2008) (―[I]f individuals‘ speech should not be attributed to intermediaries when it is 
unlawful, we should at least consider ways in which intermediaries could be deterred 
from interfering with it when it is lawful.‖).  Rebecca Tushnet argues that ―if we limit 
intermediary responsibility . . . we should also limit intermediary power to control 
speech.‖ Id. at 1009. 
 320 The ―right to freedom of opinion and expression . . . includes the freedom to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
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conducted by intermediaries who block user access to peer-to-peer 
networking sites or other websites with potentially infringing 
content, thereby preemptively censoring speech that might not be 
infringing at all.
321
  Such censorship, if conducted by a 
government, would be contrary to free speech protections and 
subject to legal recourse; however, no recourse is available to users 
when the filtering is conducted by private actors.
322
 
Users expect Internet service providers to comply with 
constitutional and human rights, and as the Internet has changed 
from being solely a means of communication to a medium for 
many other activities, such as trade and entertainment, the 
expectations for constitutional and human rights on the Internet 
have expanded beyond free speech.  For example, if users have 
built their business models on selling merchandise on eBay, and 
eBay at some point no longer allows them to sell on eBay, this has 
a drastic impact on their livelihood.  Although an initial 
 
through any media and regardless of frontiers.‖ Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
art. 19, G.A. Res 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).  The right to 
freedom of expression ―shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form 
of art, or through any other media of his choice.‖ International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights art. 19(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 99 U.N.T.S. 171. (emphasis added).  For 
permissible limitations on the right see id. at art. 19(3).  The right to freedom of 
expression ―shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.‖ European 
Convention on Human Rights art. 10(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (emphasis 
added).  For permissible limitations on the right see id. at art. 10(2); see also American 
Convention on Human Rights art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143; 
Recommendation CM/Rec(2008)6 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe to member states on measures to promote the respect for freedom of expression 
and information with regard to Internet filters, Mar. 26, 2008. 
 321 Graber, supra note 42, at 10.  For a similar argument concerning a ―prior restraint by 
proxy,‖ see Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright‘s Safe Harbor: Chilling 
Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171 (2010).  
Seltzer notes that the actions of service providers in her example are mandated by law 
and states that ―[g]overnment cannot insulate itself from responsibility for this 
abridgment of free speech by routing its influence through third-party service providers.‖  
Id. at 190. 
 322 See also Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L.R. 1373, 1398 (2010) (in 
the context of takedowns by service providers based on DMCA notifications and the 
graduated response approach). 
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incarnation of the problem of Internet users‘ expectations clashing 
with Internet service providers‘ actions was small merchants 
demanding continuing access to eBay,
323
 the subsequent debate 
about network neutrality shows that the problem of accessibility 
has entered a new and more critical stage.
324
  Not only is the right 
to free speech at stake, but other rights are as well.  For instance, 
following the unrest in Egypt in January and February 2011, 
Mohamed ElBaradei, the leading opposition figure, was quoted as 
observing that prior to the shutdown of the Internet by the 
government, the Internet had provided the right to freedom of 
association that was missing de facto on the ground.
325
  Indeed, it 
is an exercise of this constitutional right that today‘s Internet users 
expect private actors such as Twitter or Facebook to facilitate.  It is 
understandable that people relying on the infrastructure of the 
Internet will search for constitutional protections for their access to 
the infrastructure.
326
 
Constitutional and human rights may in the future shield 
Internet users not only from governmental intrusion, but also from 
certain acts by Internet service providers and other providers of 
critical infrastructure—regardless of whether such acts result from 
indirect governmental intervention or voluntary decisions by 
providers.
327
  The right to travel should enjoy parity with the right 
to free speech, the right to free assembly, the right to access to 
 
 323 ―PowerSellers‖ on eBay objected to eBay‘s practice of denying them access to the 
auction website based on repeated complaints filed against them under the DMCA, 17 
U.S.C. §512(c)(3) (2006).  For a discussion of the problem, see Trimble, Enemy Ground, 
supra note 173, at 808–09. 
 324 Cecilia Kang, FCC Approves Net-Neutrality Rules; Criticism Is Immediate, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 22, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/ 
12/21/AR2010122106110.html. 
 325 Interview by NPR with Laban Coblentz, a speechwriter for Mohamed ElBaradei 
(Feb. 7, 2011), available at http://thestory.org/archive/the_story_020711_full_show.mp3/ 
view. 
 326 Although private actors who furnish critical infrastructure may resist any new legal 
obligations that countries may attempt to impose upon them, the actors may have no 
choice other than to accept the additional obligations: if a critical part of the Internet is in 
the hands of one or a small number of private actors, countries will have a limited 
ability—short of nationalizing that part of the Internet—to protect constitutional rights in 
cyberspace. 
 327 See Interview by NPR with Laban Coblentz, supra note 325.  
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information, and other recognized constitutional and human rights 
that should be fully implemented on the Internet. 
C. Can Cybertravel be Legal? 
If we accept the premise that cybertravel, or the capability of a 
user to evade geolocation and use the Internet as if he were located 
in a location other than where he is physically located, is socially 
valuable and worth permitting in some form, the question turns to 
the conditions under which cybertravel could be legal.  As 
explained earlier, the existence of this capability does not depend 
on permitting anonymity on the Internet;
328
 anonymization and 
cybertravel need not go hand in hand. 
Thinking about the possible future of cybertravel requires 
considering all of the various policies and business motives that 
lead website operators to limit access to their content on the 
Internet.
329
  First, website operators design content limitations to 
enhance user convenience by localizing accessible content, for 
example by showing advertisements for local businesses.  Second, 
website operators may have contractual obligations with content 
providers, for example to limit access to video programs that a 
provider has licensed only for certain countries or regions.
330
  
Third, the operators may limit access to content to comply with 
laws that prohibit certain types of content in certain countries, for 
example by blocking gambling when it is outlawed by some 
countries.  Prohibitions may also apply, however, for less-
maligned content that may be made inaccessible because of 
countries‘ legal requirements—for instance, countries‘ consumer 
protection laws may require certain products to be offered only if 
they have been certified for use in the country.
331
  Fourth, website 
operators may decide voluntarily to limit access to content to avoid 
being exposed to personal jurisdiction and liability in certain 
countries where they wish to avoid litigation, taxes, regulation or 
some other type of obligation.  Finally, website operators may 
 
 328 See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 329 See supra Part II.A (discussing the various reasons). 
 330 Id. 
 331 Id. 
  
648 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:567 
implement access limitations for security reasons; for example, a 
bank will not allow a user from outside the account holder‘s 
country of residence to log into the account holder‘s account 
because the bank assumes that such a login is a fraudulent attempt 
to access the account. 
The first type of restriction—content localized for advertising 
or for user convenience—should cause the least difficulty.  There 
should be no reason for prohibiting users from viewing this type of 
content as if they were sitting in another country.  In fact, website 
operators such as Google and Lufthansa offer links to allow users 
to switch easily among different country versions.
332
  This 
switching may not be completely without cost to the website 
operator, however; if users regularly escape the ―convenience‖ of 
localized content and use other country versions in lieu of their 
own local versions, it may diminish website operators‘ advertising 
revenues because they lose some of the advantage that a 
partitioned cyberspace provides in allowing them to charge 
premium advertising rates for advertisements that target local 
consumers. 
Cybertravel that is used to evade the other types of access 
limitations listed above is problematic.  It is unrealistic to expect 
countries to allow users connecting to the Internet from their 
territory to bypass any prohibitions against certain content or 
activities by cybertraveling to another country where such content 
or activities are expressly or implicitly permitted.  Allowing 
cybertravel for these purposes would defeat the public policies 
behind the prohibitions and undermine national sovereignty.  
Similarly, it is difficult to defend cybertravel that is used for the 
purpose of bypassing geolocation tools employed by website 
operators who are complying with contractual obligations, seeking 
to avoid personal jurisdiction and liability, or protecting 
themselves and others against criminal activities.  The question is 
whether there is a way to permit cybertravel when it is conducted 
to avoid these types of limitations, but the conduct has a legitimate 
goal, such as accessing one‘s own bank account from a foreign 
 
 332 Id. 
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country.  The method of cybertravel is not important, because the 
tools for its implementation will change;
333
 what is important is 
that travel to another portion of cyberspace be possible.
334
 
There are three perspectives from which possible solutions for 
the future of cybertravel will arise: legal, technological and 
business.  As has been shown by other examples in the Internet 
environment, a combination of solutions from all three 
perspectives seems most likely to succeed.  For example, laws that 
prohibit copyright infringement have not stopped online music 
piracy, and neither have filters that have been imposed by Internet 
service providers or automatic warnings that are generated by 
college campus service providers.  Although these measures and 
laws addressing piracy have probably slowed online music and 
film piracy, the solutions had to be assisted by business solutions, 
such as iTunes and Netflix, to offer a legal and viable alternative to 
piracy. 
As discussed earlier in section IV.A, a number of legal 
doctrines cover issues potentially associated with cybertravel; 
however, because these doctrines were neither created for nor 
shaped with cybertravel in mind, courts will be required to 
determine the extent to which the doctrines may make illegal all or 
some instances of cybertravel.
335
  Whatever the status of 
cybertravel will be, it will be beneficial to clarify the applicability 
of existing laws to cybertravel and possibly draft specific 
regulations to govern cybertravel further.  If IPv6 makes IPv4 
obsolete and a transition actually occurs to permanently assigned 
or embedded IP addresses, the transition could provide momentum 
for the creation of cybertravel-specific legislation, and perhaps 
even for an agreement on a legislative solution at the international 
level. 
Within some permitted extent, cybertravel, as an equivalent to 
physical international travel, could be subject to reasonable 
 
 333 See supra Part III (explaining the functioning of various cybertravel tools). 
 334 See supra Part I (explaining the ―borderlessness‖ of the Internet and the impetus for 
partitioning of the Internet). 
 335 See supra Part IV.A. 
  
650 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:567 
limitations.  Traditionally, the obligation to carry a passport is 
considered one such limitation, and a digital passport could serve 
this purpose for cybertravel.  The passport could either be a virtual 
equivalent to a physical passport and carry the same personally 
identifiable data of the holder/Internet user, or be a document with 
only limited information, such as the user‘s location.  The location 
identified in either type of passport could be either the current 
physical location of the user or the place of residence or domicile 
of the user, depending on the criterion that was set as the factor 
determining the accessibility of the Internet content. 
Although intuition seems to dictate the selection of the user‘s 
current physical location as the determining factor, the other 
option—place of residence or domicile—should not be summarily 
excluded.  The prevailing principle of territoriality of law suggests 
that current physical location be the correct solution; under the 
principle, laws apply territorially, or alternatively stated, the 
prescriptive jurisdiction of a country extends only to the country‘s 
borders—and outside its borders only to the extent that the 
country‘s jurisdiction covers acts that have effects within its 
borders.  Another principle, the principle of personality of law, 
exists as well, but with less applicability because the principle of 
territoriality of law applies to the vast majority of the legislative 
activities of a country.  The use of residence or domicile as the 
determinative factor for access to Internet content would present a 
remarkable opportunity to introduce the principle of personality of 
law for activity on the Internet.  Under this principle countries 
legislate for their own nationals and permanent residents and the 
laws follow those persons wherever they travel.  An analysis of the 
issues surrounding personality of law on the Internet is beyond the 
scope of this article and deserves a separate study, but is worth 
mentioning. 
A law for digital passports cannot exist without a technological 
implementation.  It is not difficult to imagine such a system if the 
IPv6-related vision of permanently assigned or embedded IP 
addresses that would identify specific devices (or even persons if 
the devices were embedded in human bodies) becomes a reality; 
the law could make it illegal to change or reroute an IP address 
because that act would be equivalent to forging a physical 
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passport.  The digital passport would inform each website operator 
about the location of the user, or the user‘s residence or domicile, 
depending on the information in the passport. 
Knowing exactly how many cybertravelers are connecting to a 
website and from what locations could assist intellectual property 
owners, for example, in the creation of tailored licensing 
schemes;
336
 if information about cybertravelers were to include 
personal identifiers, the system could become what Paul Goldstein 
described in 1994 as the ―celestial jukebox‖337—a service that 
would allow on-demand access to copyrighted works from 
anywhere in the world for a fee.
338
  The digital environment is 
perfectly equipped to implement this system;
339
 in such a world, 
each user could access copyrighted works from anywhere in the 
world and be charged only for works that the user accessed.  This 
is where a technological solution would prompt the need for a 
business solution. 
What hampers progress towards a ―celestial jukebox‖ are the 
significant transaction costs associated with the identification and 
location of right holders and the negotiation of licenses with 
multiple right holders.  The magnitude of these costs must be 
addressed in order for global licensing to be feasible, and there are 
initiatives being developed in this area to pave the way for this 
type of solution;
340
 for example, experts have proposed that the 
World Intellectual Property Organization create and administer an 
international repertoire database,
341
 and other experts are exploring 
 
 336 See Loesing et al., supra note 156, at 205 (―There are estimated to be hundreds of 
thousands [of] Tor users every day routing their data through the Tor network.‖). 
 337 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT‘S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL 
JUKEBOX 28–29 (1994). Paul Goldstein claims no credit for the celestial jukebox 
metaphor.  
 338 See id. 
 339 See id.  
 340 See Jane C. Ginsburg, International Issues: Which Country‘s Law Applies When 
Works Are Made Available Over the Internet?, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 49, 53 (2010) 
(―[T]he practice . . . of extended collective licenses, albeit not yet E.U. wide, is 
growing.‖). 
 341 Kaitlin Mara & William New, Should WIPO Lead Creation of a Global Repertoire 
Database?, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog 
/2010/11/22/should-wipo-lead-creation-of-global-database-of-music-repertoire/.  The 
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possibilities for cross-border collective management of rights in 
the digital environment.
342
 
Even without a celestial jukebox solution that would cover all 
works globally, and even without digital passports, there is clearly 
space for smaller-scale business solutions to meet the challenges of 
cybertravel.  If content is limited because of the contractual 
obligations of website operators, cybertravel could be enabled by 
global or regional licensing schemes that would allow operators to 
offer certain content either worldwide or in selected countries.
343
  
Instead of paying cybertravel providers to facilitate cybertravel, 
users would pay for access directly to website operators, who 
would then bear any licensing costs and any other costs associated 
with the content, such as a public television licensing fee. 
Of course, these solutions are directed only toward access to 
content that is restricted because of contractual limitations; any 
content that is illegal in a country will continue to be inaccessible 
to users accessing the Internet from that country, and potentially to 
nationals or permanent residents of that country even when they 
are temporarily present in another country, if digital passports are 
used.  For certain types of content—and the instances of these 
types of content are likely to be limited—countries may reconsider 
the legal status of content in light of the possibilities afforded by 
digital passports.  For example, some countries might reconsider 
 
Court of Justice of the European Union has undertaken what may be interpreted as a push 
for pan-European licensing. See Cases C-403/08 & C-429/08, Football Ass‘n Premier 
League Ltd. v. QC Leisure (Oct. 4, 2011), available at http://curia.europa.eu 
/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=110361&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode
=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=27863. 
 342 E.g., Torben Toft, Collective Rights Management in the Online World: A Review of 
Recent Commission Initiatives, EUR. COMM‘N, DG COMPETITION, at 14 (June 8, 2006), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2006_008_en.pdf; see generally Brian R. 
Day, Collective Management of Music Copyright in the Digital Age: The Online 
Clearinghouse, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 195 (2010); A Digital Agenda for Europe: 
Commc‘n from the Comm‘n to the Eur. Parl., the Council, the Eur. Econ. and Social 
Comm. and the Comm. of the Regions, COM(2010) 245 final (Aug. 26, 2010).  
 343 See supra Part IV.A.1 (providing an example of the BBC preparing to launch its TV 
shows for viewing by users accessing the BBC website from outside the United 
Kingdom). 
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their stance on online gambling if they have the ability to tax users 
located in their country who use foreign online gambling sites. 
The solutions also fail to address cases in which access to 
content is limited by a website operator‘s or content provider‘s 
choice; these cases arise because of issues of jurisdiction, taxation 
or online security.  When website operators or content providers 
decide sua sponte to restrict their content to certain viewers, users 
have minimal recourse; only in rare circumstances will a 
government direct private entities to make content more widely 
available than it already is.  Here a system of digital passports 
could prove useful; for example, if access to content were based on 
a user‘s permanent residence, content could be made available to a 
qualified user while he was temporarily located in another country, 
without exposing the website operator to jurisdiction or taxation in 
that country. 
Finally, knowledge of the numbers and physical locations of 
cybertravelers could make possible not only sophisticated licensing 
arrangements but also agreements—either private (meaning 
between individual content providers and website operators) or 
international (meaning among countries)—as to an acceptable 
level of free spillover.  In the physical world, it is accepted that 
some content limited to a certain country will be available to those 
who travel to that country.  For example, when distribution rights 
under copyright are licensed for one country, it is understood that 
some of the copyrighted works will land in the hands of persons 
who are present in the country only temporarily and those persons 
may carry the work with them to other countries; laws provide 
exceptions for individual users to do this because it is considered 
natural spillover.
344
  Exceptions for a similar reasonable spillover 
could be permitted for cybertravel.  However, without information 
about the extent of cybertravel, it is impossible to find arguments 
 
 344 E.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 60, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; Council Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003 of 22 July 2003 
concerning customs action against goods suspected of infringing certain intellectual 
property rights and the measures to be taken against goods found to have infringed such 
rights, art. 3(2), 2003 OJ (L 196) 7, 9. 
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to support the exceptions for the spillover; a passport system would 
allow the collection of such information. 
CONCLUSION 
This article presents a comprehensive analysis of cybertravel—
the evasion by a user of geolocation that prevents the user from 
viewing certain Internet content from the user‘s physical location.  
By cybertraveling, the user can view the Internet as if the user 
were located in a country other than the country in which the user 
is physically located.  The goal of the article is to explain what 
cybertravel is, why it exists, what purposes it serves, what its legal 
status is, what arguments exist for making it available in the future, 
and what solutions might be developed to allow users to 
cybertravel for legitimate purposes without undermining the 
evolution of the Internet.  It seems clear that even though 
cybertravel will probably not survive in its current form, new 
technological and business solutions will preserve the concept and 
the law will complement these solutions. 
The current importance of questions regarding the future of 
cybertravel is heightened by the desire of governments and the 
private sector to erect borders on the Internet to achieve 
compliance with territorially-defined regulation.  This article 
assumes that this desire is shaping or will shape the future of the 
Internet, and that geolocation tools will play a major role in the 
future in light of user disfavor toward alternative types of access 
controls: user hardware filtering and Internet service provider 
filtering.  However, it is possible that countries will adopt still 
other approaches to the problem of ―missing borders.‖  For 
example, courts could continue to use a low-technology approach 
to defining personal jurisdiction on the Internet,
345
 thereby 
relieving website operators of the necessity of employing 
geolocation tools to comply with the laws of different countries.  
Or, instead of mandating Internet service provider filtering of 
 
 345 See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing the low-technology approach 
to the determination of personal jurisdiction). 
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possibly prohibited content, countries could decide to implement 
detailed Internet traffic monitoring and aggressively identify and 
pursue users engaging in illegal activity in cases where countries 
cannot pursue website operators. 
Although it is possible that the use of geolocation tools will not 
be the method of choice for the territorial partitioning of 
cyberspace in the future, it appears to be the preferred method at 
present.  Partitioning through the use of geolocation tools enjoys a 
number of advantages when compared to other available 
methods,
346
 and even if the alleged benefits of IPv6 are not fully 
utilized and IPv6 does not lead to permanently assigned or 
embedded IP addresses, geolocation tools can still function to 
achieve the goal of cyberspace partitioning that many Internet 
actors desire.  However, for Internet partitioning to be truly 
effective the problem of cybertravel must be addressed; cybertravel 
frustrates the success of geolocation tools, making it difficult to 
determine or even estimate the effectiveness of these tools.
347
 
The legal framework in which cybertravel operates is a 
patchwork of legal doctrines that were not formulated to regulate 
cybertravel, or even conceived with cybertravel in mind.
348
  
Whether the doctrines apply to cybertravel, and if so to what 
extent, are questions that courts will have to address.  Copyright 
will probably be the area in which litigation will first arise, and the 
first issues targeted will be associated with making content 
available to audiences to whom the copyright holder did not intend 
to extend access.  These disputes will emulate cases concerning 
place-shifting services that have arisen recently, such as litigation 
involving ManekiTV in Japan, TV Catch UP in the United 
Kingdom, and ivi and Justin.tv in the United States.
349
  Cybertravel 
disputes will define the next generation of these cases. 
 
 346 See supra Part I, IV.B.3 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the 
methods of partitioning cyberspace). 
 347 See supra Part II.B (discussing the effectiveness of geolocation tools). 
 348 See supra Part IV.A (discussing the current legal status of cybertravel). 
 349 See supra Part Introduction, IV.A.2 (discussing the cases and their potential impact 
on cybertravel). 
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The extent to which cases concerning cybertravel will appear 
in courts, what the outcome of such cases might be, and whether or 
not any particular legal doctrines will be found to apply to 
cybertravel, are questions that merit a thorough analysis.  The 
undeniable value in being able to view the Internet as if one were 
located in another country, and the legitimate reasons why users 
want or need to cybertravel warrant the consideration of options 
for legal cybertravel.  This article suggests that cybertravel should 
be analogized to physical travel, and the benefits that society will 
enjoy through cybertravel correspond in large measure to the 
benefits provided by physical travel.
350
  Therefore, cybertravel 
should enjoy constitutionally protected rights. 
Of course, cybertravel is free of the natural barriers that limit 
physical travel.  As a result, a greater number of users can engage 
in cybertravel than in physical travel, and the volume and quality 
of reproduction of the content that cybertravelers can obtain will 
usually be much higher than that of the content that physical 
travelers may carry back to their country.
351
  This means that 
content spillover that may be negligible in cases of physical travel 
can in the case of cybertravel almost instantaneously exceed what 
anyone might consider reasonable spillover.
352
  For example, while 
the number of foreign visitors who buy a book in one country and 
travel home with it may number in the thousands, the number of 
foreign users cybertraveling to access a television show may be in 
the millions.  One problem for cybertravel is that there are no data 
available to suggest the size of the cybertravel phenomenon, and it 
is difficult to formulate arguments in response to those who claim 
that cybertravel is a significant problem unless some data are 
collected to support a claim that cybertravel, like physical travel, 
leads to only negligible spillover. 
 
 350 See supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the arguments for equating cybertravel to physical 
travel). 
 351 High volume data storage allows for a similar volume of data to be transported 
physically and with the same potential reproduction quality.  However, cybertravel 
remains a faster and easier mode for transporting data. 
 352 See supra Part IV.C (discussing a reasonable spillover associated with physical 
travel). 
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Even if it can be proven that cybertravel does not currently 
pose any significant threat to right holders, website operators, and 
countries‘ efforts to limit access to certain content, cybertravel 
technology is rapidly changing and new simplified tools permit 
more users, even ones with extremely limited technical skills, to 
cybertravel.  More Internet users will also be prompted to 
cybertravel because of the increased use of geolocation tools by 
website operators.  The legal, technological, and business solutions 
will need to address the practice of cybertravel and shape an 
environment in which legal cybertravel—cybertravel for legitimate 
purposes—will be available. 
This article explores one answer to cybertravel—a system of 
digital passports that would either identify specific users or provide 
a minimum of information about a user‘s location, domicile, or 
permanent residence.  A technological solution supported by an 
appropriate legal framework and enhanced by sophisticated 
business solutions could solve the problem of cybertravel and 
increase the opportunities that the partitioned Internet offers.  This 
system would need to be supported by a strict data protection 
structure that would impose both legal and technical requirements 
on Internet actors.  Although increased data protection 
requirements may face strong resistance from some Internet actors 
today, strict data protection must be integrated into the cyberspace 
future. 
 
